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


For a new culture

Italian original:

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world. And, at the same time, religion itself would be placed at the centre as the matrix of a “theological” culture-knowledge: not by merit (obviously) of dynontorganic ideological mediation but of “realist-dynamic metaphysics” that, even though under a different title, presents itself as the “theological” and “ideological” cultural matrix: “theological” as the indispensable component of theological method; and “ideological” as advocate of the “dynontorganic rationality” of praxis.

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expressions: from the properly metaphysical level, to mathematics (which is not an operatively autonomous “mathematical cultural matrix”), technology, the different anthropological sciences, art and literature, and the means of social communication.

Faced with realist-dynamic metaphysics as cultural matrix and its role-function, two practical conclusions follow. The first regards the “Christian religion”, and therefore the Church, the ecclesial Community; the second regards “culture-knowledge” taken in itself.

Speaking in terms of culture-knowledge, what we have called the “humanist interlude” raised the question of the relationship between faith and science, a question that became bitter in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Today, instead, the great new problem is that of the relationship between faith and politics, with the consequent problem of “evangelization and human promotion”. To this end one tends to place hope on the “cultural mediation” offered by the Church to the world, insofar as the Church has all the Christian and authentically human values to offer the society of the present and the future.

It is a question therefore of “culture-values”. But before the offer of culture-values as the new cultural mediation between Church and world, we need to face the problem of the cultural mediation that is “demanded”. What is the first demand for cultural mediation made of Christianity? In keeping with the theme of culture-knowledge, we propose that it is realist-dynamic metaphysics in its role of “cultural matrix”.

If today Christianity wants to continue being not only the great and only salvific religion in the spiritual and eternal sense, but also the great and irreplaceable “matrix of civilization”, it must itself “accept a mediation” that would make concretely possible and efficacious its offer of cultural mediation in the sense of culture-values.

Such a mediation has its roots in realist-dynamic metaphysics and becomes concrete in the offer of “dynontorganic ideology”.

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Christianity is a religion, the religion *par excellence*, the only true religion. It is not in any sense an ideology. If however it wants to once again be the “matrix of civilization”, it needs the “mediation” offered by “dynontorganic ideology”. This mediation is “triple”:

- “ontologico-dynamic ideological mediation”, that re-harmonizes dynontorganically the present dynamic world with religion;
- “ethical” dynontorganic ideological mediation, which, by focusing on the ethico-religious values, translates them into “ethico-ideological” values, making them once again acceptable to the new secular dynamic society; and
- “cultural mediation”, still in reference to “culture-knowledge”.

As we have said, the “culture-knowledge” of dynamic metaphysical inspiration has overtaken the mechanism of the new civilization. We must therefore dispose of such a culture-knowledge in its mediating function between Church and world. And this is precisely the third mediation that dynontorganic ideology, with its starting point in realist-dynamic metaphysics as cultural matrix, offers to the Church for its new relationship with the world.

How is such a culture-knowledge elaborated? Who elaborates it? What is important for the moment is to grasp the problem, and to understand that it will be resolved “practically”. We need to elaborate this “culture-knowledge”, whose role becomes decisive because of the fact that, in the mechanism of the new secular dynamic civilization, it occupies first place. A huge responsibility for the Catholic world at all levels, that touches everyone.

From what has been said it is evident that the problem of culture-knowledge in reference to the new secular dynamic civilization is linked not so much to religion (and to Revelation) as to dynamic metaphysics (for us: “realist-dynamic” metaphysics) and to “ideology”.

Even this forms part of the shift from the Faith-science relationship to the Faith-politics relationship, which obviously today has to be “ideological” politics in the best sense of the term. Keeping in mind the “decisive cultural matrix”, which is dynamic metaphysics, and for us “realist-dynamic metaphysics”, the old motto (proposed by Fr Gemelli to the Università Cattolica):

“*In religione scientia, in scientia religio*” could be rendered thus: “*In ideologia civilitas, in civilitate ideologia*”. Through the mediation of dynontorganic ideology, there would take place the recovery of the Christian religion as the matrix of civilization, opening up a new hope for the



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culture we mean culture-knowledge.

To say that realist-dynamic metaphysics is a “cultural matrix” is to say that it “produces knowledge”. But what “knowledge”? We must respond: the knowledge that in the present dynamic historical epoch is at the root of the whole of civilization.

At the root of civilization in the static-sacral epoch was “religion” and that religious knowledge that was identified with Faith. From religion there emerged civilization, which could then equip itself with reflexive knowledge in the sense of culture-knowledge, beginning with theology. In the new dynamic historical epoch, instead, at the root of civilization there is “ideology” as rationalized praxis and the “dynamic” metaphysics that grasps it and imposes “rationality” on it. Civilization is a “human product”, which in the static-sacral historical epoch took its origin from “religion”, but in the secular dynamic epoch takes its origin from the “culture-knowledge” offered by dynamic metaphysics, which thus constitutes the matrix of the whole civil edifice, conditioning even religion itself.

Religion continues to be the decisive factor of civilization, even the factor *par excellence*, but it is now a factor conditioned by dynamic metaphysics and by the consequent culture-knowledge. It is dynamic metaphysics that interprets the rationality of the new dynamic historical reality and its corresponding rationalized praxis. And it is precisely such “rationality” that is at the basis of the new secular dynamic civilization.

Now dynamic metaphysics, if it is “realist-dynamic”, interprets the “rationality” we have been talking about in a “theo-spiritual dynontorganic” sense, becoming the matrix of civilization in the theo-spiritual dynontorganic sense. If, on the contrary, it is immanentist, it interprets the rationality in question in an “atheist-materialist” sense, producing an atheist-materialist culture-knowledge and becoming the matrix of an atheist-materialist civilization.

This means that today it is “dynamic metaphysics”, precisely as cultural matrix, that offers or else denies religion its “cultural passport”. Hence the “role” of “realist-dynamic metaphysics” as “theo-spiritual dynontorganic” cultural matrix: to offer the new cultural passport to the Christian religion, that it might once again be the “fundamental matrix of civilization”.

The Christian religion does not need realist-dynamic metaphysics to save souls (it does not need even theological science for this), because nothing can block the action of the Holy Spirit, that “*ubi vult spirat*”. But we are here referring to that human-historical reality called “civilization”, a reality 54

that has ceased being a static-sacral affair of religious inspiration and has transformed itself into a “secular dynamic civilization of ideological inspiration”, in complete dependence on dynamic metaphysics. This metaphysics, as cultural matrix, establishes rationality as either theo-spiritual dynontorganic or else atheist-materialist, on which it constructs the entire civic socio-political edifice.

If therefore Christianity is considered not as a religion offering spiritual and eternal salvation through the action of the Holy Spirit that nothing can block, but as matrix of culture and civilization, its conditioning by dynamic metaphysics can be seen to be evident and decisive. Either we have theo-spiritual and dynontorganic realist-dynamic metaphysics, and then the Christian religion recovers its passport as cultural matrix; or else immanentist atheist-materialist dynamic metaphysics, and the Christian religion, despite its vocation, ceases in fact to be the matrix of civilization.

These reflections can suffice to give us a glimpse of the role and decisive function of realistdynamic metaphysics as cultural matrix. But let us see their implications.

7. The implications of the cultural matrix

Realist-dynamic metaphysics is first the “cultural matrix” with respect to culture-knowledge; and then, through culture-knowledge, of the whole of culture-civilization. It is the cultural matrix in the full and primary sense, because the very Christian religion as “cultural matrix” is, in this new dynamic historical epoch, completely conditioned by dynamic metaphysics, and positively by “realist-dynamic” metaphysics.

We have already seen the two outcomes of this: the theologico-ecclesiological outcome, and the ideologico-dynontorganic one. These outcomes also form part of its function as “cultural matrix”. This function, through ideology as rationalized praxis which “dynontorganic rationality” grasps and imposes, is destined to permeate “the whole of civilization”, at all levels and in all its

scheme that obeyed the following sequence: “religion – tradition – values of civilization – knowledge”, the last understood as reflective thought and knowledge in all its expressions, theological, philosophical, scientific, artistic-literary.

In this sequence, the primacy of religion as cultural matrix is evident. It is also evident that “culture-knowledge” is in the last place, if not in importance, at least in line of causality. In the old static-sacral historical epoch it is not culture-knowledge that produces civilization and makes human existence possible. It is rather sacral civilization (and therefore religion) that produces and animates culture-knowledge, making it therefore an effect. Culture-knowledge is therefore not a cause but an effect of the sequence which begins from religion.

In the old static-sacral historical epoch religion maintained the primacy of causality in so far as it would impose itself by means of tradition, impose values, sacralize all the expressions of life, constitute the foundation of knowledge and animate all branches of knowledge, including those apparently most distant from it.

Oriental philosophies are more “theologies” than philosophies. Reflective classical thought (philosophy, science, literature) separated itself from religion only up to a point, in so far as the classical religions, in contrast to the oriental religions that absorbed the human being and nature into their “theology”, did not condition the investigations of the “wise man”, thus making space for a “humanist” knowledge that nevertheless remained subordinate to religion and was inserted into the corresponding static-sacral society, itself part of a cultural synthesis between religion and civilization.

It was Christianity that broke up this synthesis, making a distinction between “nature” and “supernature”, between “man” and the “Divine”, thus not only making possible a “humanist” knowledge of the human being and of nature quite distinct from “theological” knowledge, but, paradoxically, imposing it. When, and how? When society felt the need of it and therefore when the corresponding historical demand arose.

Let us prescind from the historical vicissitudes in this regard, which retrospectively do not appear completely satisfactory, neither from the religious side nor from the secular. On the other hand, the historical demand in the early period of Christianity was, and remained for centuries, a “religious demand” on the part of static-sacral society, up to the point of establishing on the one side an apparent antinomy between Christianity and humanism, and on the other a constant disagreement between the two terms.

This disagreement was and remains fundamentally a disagreement of a cultural nature, in the sense of culture-knowledge: a disagreement that, apart from abstract affirmations of principle, is still not healed today, mainly because the clear distinction between theological culture and

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humanist culture is neither properly understood nor gives the prospect of a proper synthesis between the two, when such a thing might be possible and even necessary.

Already the old secular humanist culture-knowledge diffused in the modern epoch (philosophy, science, humanist-secular para-ideologies since the time of the Enlightenment) imposed itself as the first ring in the cultural sequence, displacing religion and putting into crisis the traditional scheme. This reversal was made final and total by the new “dynamic ideological culture-knowledge”, up to the point of having to say that the “new secular dynamic civilization” no longer starts from religion in order to arrive at culture-knowledge, but begins from culture-knowledge, passing through the culture-values imposed by the latter, and arrives at the new secular dynamic civilization as product of culture-knowledge and of its corresponding cultural matrix.

In the cultural sequence religion has thus passed from the first to the last place, if not completely excluded. No longer dealing with a sacral civilization as function of religion, but with a secular civilization as function of culture-knowledge, the radical reversal and loss of the cultural role on the part of religion is something taken for granted. Everything is already virtually present in the substitution of religion with ideology as rationalized praxis in its function of foundation and soul of the new secular dynamic society. The important thing is to take into account that everything depends anyhow on “culture-knowledge”, the problem of which presents itself above all as the problem of the corresponding “cultural matrix”.

6. The cultural role of realist-dynamic metaphysics

At this point, we must ask about the “cultural role” of realist-dynamic metaphysics, where by

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4

PROLOGUE

This book deals mainly with 'realistic-dynamic metaphysics.'

Such a metaphysics, like metaphysics in general and, in a broader sense, philosophy, is a cultural fact, a cultural expression in the sense of 'culture-knowledge.' It is, however, - and here we continue to refer to culture-knowledge - distinct from other cultural expressions, because it has a special function, which in the present dynamic secular historical epoch assumes a decisive value. This is its function as 'cultural matrix,' where culture is understood now not only in the sense of culture-knowledge but also in the sense of 'culture-values' and of 'culture-civilization,' so that it becomes the 'radical cultural matrix' with reference to culture taken in a global sense. The destiny of culture-civilization in the new dynamic-secular historical epoch thus remains linked to 'dynamic metaphysics' precisely as cultural matrix, while in the old static-sacral historical epoch it was tied to religion, including the Christian religion, insofar as religion was the 'matrix of civilization.'

In this way the role of 'cultural matrix' has passed, at least in part, from religion to 'dynamic metaphysics,' whether it is a question of 'immanentist' and therefore substantially 'atheist-materialist' dynamic metaphysics, or of realist-dynamic metaphysics, whose cultural outcome is 'theo-spiritual.'

The pages that follow are animated by the theo-spiritual cultural matrix of realist-dynamic metaphysics, even if expressed differently according to the needs of each argument. The title of the present work is, therefore, more functional than reflecting the content. It wishes to emphasize the fact that 'realist-dynamic metaphysics' presents itself as the 'matrix' of a new 'religious and social culture' that is an alternative to the varieties of immanentist dynamic metaphysics that are the 'matrices' of a religious and social culture that is atheist and materialist.

T. D.

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secular dynamic culture". A soul and foundation that is "mediated" (no longer "direct") of the new secular dynamic society; and "mediated" cultural matrix of the new secular dynamic culture: precisely through the "mediation of the dynontorganic Christian ideology" and of the corresponding theist-spiritual "ideological Absolute", and the mediation of the very ideology itself as new dynamic and secular cultural matrix.

In one word: the static-sacral historical epoch was accompanied by a culture that was either religious or of religious inspiration. Instead, the new secular dynamic historical epoch is accompanied by a secular dynamic culture and a secular dynamic ideological matrix. Historically, the passage from one culture to the other, from one matrix to the other, is not simple. Most interesting for such a passage is the "humanist interlude", to which we now turn.

4. The humanist interlude

The passage in question, from religion to ideology as rationalized praxis, depending on objective historical reality itself and not on invention by some genius however gifted, has had its rhythms and fortunes, giving rise to a historical process that could as a whole be called "the humanist interlude". After the self-assertion of political power and of the knowledge of nature, Christian sacral society and the concomitant Christian sacral civilization whose matrix was the Christian religion with the corresponding religious Absolute, could not continue being tolerated forever by the secular currents, which, in the name of the human being, were aspiring to a new society that was no longer sacral but secular, to a political power that was distinct from and even antagonistic to the religious power, as well as to a culture with a rational philosophical matrix rather than a religious-theological one.

There began in this way a revolutionary process that was still far from being a proper ideological revolution (made possible only by the Industrial Revolution), that we refer to as the "humanist interlude".

Culturally this process presents itself as a period of transition from the old Christian religious culture to the new secular ideological culture, without however the ability to dismantle the old static-sacral society or the civilization that accompanied it.

Historically, "the humanist interlude takes shape with humanism, consolidates itself with the Renaissance, defines itself as 'secular' with the Enlightenment, imposes itself politically with the French Revolution that sets in motion the secularization of the State, but not yet that of civil society".

It is important to take note of the characteristics of this "humanist interlude", which we can reduce to three: the "substitution" of the divine Absolute with the "pseudo-Absolute of the human being understood as an autonomous and sovereign individual"; "culture-knowledge" getting the upper hand over culture-civilization and culture-value, upsetting the mechanism of the old sacral civilization; the consequent "primacy of reason" (and therefore definitively that of metaphysics) over Revelation and religious faith.

It is this process that gives rise to the primacy of metaphysics, which, transforming itself into dynamic metaphysics, will end by becoming the determinant cultural matrix of the new secular

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dynamic historical epoch. Reason, in fact, before (or after) being scientific reason, is "metaphysical" reason. And it is this especially as dynamic metaphysics in the dynamic historical epoch, placing itself first, after, and above scientific reason itself.

The individual scientist can prescind from metaphysics (and, in some cases, must even do so in virtue of method). But the dynamic historical reality cannot avoid coming to terms with dynamic metaphysics, because this is its basic cultural matrix. Such metaphysics, precisely because "metaphysics" and no longer "theology", has finished by radically reversing the old cultural scheme and the imprint of the old Christian civilization. This is what has happened since the time of humanism.

In this way, after the old Christian cultural revolution, there began a new and ambiguous cultural revolution that was no longer Christian (or at least no longer Christian in the sacral religious sense), and which believed it had found its epicentre no longer in the divine Absolute but in the human being.

5. The reversal of the cultural scheme

The structure of the old sacral civilization (Christian or non-Christian) contained a cultural

would not yet be civilization.

In point of fact, civilization and culture combine and tend to become synonymous, even if the terms do not lose completely their distinct meanings. Keeping in mind their synonymy and the corresponding global and synthetic reality, we will use them freely as per our need.

In any case, the most important distinction does not regard the two terms but the collocation of the corresponding realities in the “static” and “dynamic” historical epochs. This is a collocation that the “cultural matrix” is particularly interested in. We already know that in the “static historical epoch” (which was also static-sacral) there was a predominance of religion as foundation and soul of society, while in the dynamic historical epoch the role of foundation and soul of society passed over to ideology as rationalized praxis. This change of roles between religion and ideology is reflected also in culture, first of all with respect to the cultural matrix.

3. Culture in the static and dynamic historical epochs

The primacy of religion in the static-sacral historical epoch imposed itself not only with respect to the society of which it was the soul and foundation, but also in relation to culture, becoming its principal matrix. There is no society without culture. If therefore religion is the foundation and soul of society, it will be the foundation and soul also of culture, inasmuch as it generates it and forms it from within, or to the extent that it becomes its matrix.

It is a question of a generalized factual datum that can be summarized in this universal norm: in the static-sacral historical epoch, culture and civilization, if not themselves religious, always have a religious matrix. Human life has also a profane aspect, besides the religious one. But the problem is whether religion invades also the profane sector of human life, “sacralizing” it, or whether the latter remains autonomous.

The two historical epochs, static and dynamic, lead to two different solutions to the problem: the “static-sacral” and the “dynamic-secular”. If therefore we refer to the static-sacral historical epoch, we must repeat that religion, being the foundation and soul of society, would translate itself also into the great matrix of civilization and culture, without however leading to an identification of religion and civilization, religion and culture. The distinction between the two holds a fundamental importance especially for the Christian religion, which, given the non-identity of religion and culture, has never given rise to a “Christian” culture or civilization in the strict sense, but only to cultures and civilizations “of Christian inspiration”.

We must ask whether the Christian religion still continues to play such a role in the dynamic historical epoch. The answer must be negative, for the following reason: if in the dynamic historical epoch religion ceases to be the foundation and soul of the new secular dynamic society, it ceases also to be the foundation and soul of its culture, or the “matrix” of the culture and civilization of the new secular dynamic society. This also is a fact that has been amply confirmed by experience, so much so as to constitute a type of law of history.

On this basis, it is illusory to dream of a culture of Christian “religious” inspiration for the new secular dynamic society. This would be an unjustified projection of the mechanism of the staticsacral historical epoch onto the secular dynamic historical epoch: an illusion or a contradictory operation that cannot avoid (and quite rightly) the charge of “integralism”.

This, however, does not exhaust the problem, insofar as the Christian religion can, and must continue to be, in some way a “cultural matrix” also with regard to the new secular dynamic culture. The reason is evident: there cannot be a society that is not founded upon an “Absolute” and

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not animated by it. Such an “Absolute”, as ground and soul of society, also animates and grounds the corresponding culture, becoming precisely its matrix.

If therefore, in the secular dynamic historical epoch, the Absolute that grounds and animates the new secular dynamic society is no longer the religious “Absolute”, because this society (in rejecting religion as its soul and foundation) rejects it, and instead accepts “ideology” and therefore an “ideological Absolute” as its soul and foundation, it follows that the “foundation and soul of society” and of the new cultural matrix will be an “ideological Absolute”, either in harmony with the religious Absolute or in antithesis with it.

It is only by accepting the “mediation of the ideological Absolute” (and therefore also of the corresponding ideology) that is “in harmony with the Christian religion, that the latter can once again become the foundation and soul of the new secular dynamic society and matrix of a new

I. THE ONTOLOGICAL PASSAGE FROM THE STATIC TO THE DYNAMIC

1. The content of the problem

“To grasp the historical reality of today: no longer static-sacral but dynamic-secular”: this is the problem. It is a question of an ‘ontologico-metaphysical’ rather than simply a phenomenal grasp. Phenomenally we are all already convinced that there has been a shift “from the static to the dynamic”. But this shift, besides being phenomenal, is also “ontological”, and must be understood in its ontological reality, in so far as it is of an “ontological nature”. It is a question of a “passage” not from one phenomenology to another, but from a “static historical” (or better: static-sacral) reality to a “dynamic secular’ historical ontological reality”. An ontological passage, therefore from the static to the dynamic. To grasp historical reality as no longer static-sacral, but as “ontologically” dynamic and secular: this is the cultural imperative of today. It is equivalent to grasping the problem in its “ontologico-metaphysical”, and not merely sociologico-phenomenal, importance. The problem therefore engages us at the ontologico-metaphysical level, whether as “content” or as “method”.

The content of the problem in its decisive aspect (and it is this that must interest us) is ontologico-metaphysical, and not simply sociologico-phenomenal; this last would be superficial and hardly decisive. Not only is the “content” of the problem ontologico-metaphysical, but also the method for confronting it and resolving it. Theoretically this affirmation can be justified *a priori*, on the grounds that the method of research should match the formal (specific) object of the research itself.

The formal or specific object of our study is the “historical reality” to be grasped in its “profound ontological nature”, in its “real and objective being”, without emptying it either in the subject “man” or in a “phenomenology” of man, or in the abstractness of “values”, or in an idealist historicism.

2. The method of study

The method of such a study, therefore, must be the “realist objective” philosophical method.

This is distinguished from the “idealist subjective” method in all its expressions, and excludes every contamination by it. Why such rigidity? Because it is demanded by the “scope” of the study: to reach a “realist-objective ontologico-metaphysical knowledge” of historical reality. “Realist”, not idealist; “objective” and not subjective.

A knowledge therefore that is constituted by “gnoseological realism” and “objectivity of content”. Not because historical reality cannot be known also by the idealist-subjective method, but because the latter gives a metaphysically subjective knowledge of it, while we, “in order to act”, have need of a realist objective ontologico-metaphysical knowledge of actual dynamic historical reality. The reason is evident: in order to act well, we need “to know well” the reality in which, through which and with which we act. The first condition is true knowledge of it as *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, or the adequation of intelligence to the thing, and not vice versa.

The “temptation of the idealist subjective method” is backed by a philosophico-cultural tradition that runs from Descartes up to existentialism, and is difficult to overcome, whether culturally or psychologically. There is, in addition, a third difficulty of an operative nature. One could in fact ask: is it possible to apply fruitfully and coherently the “realist-objective ontologico-metaphysical method” to historical reality, seeing that historical reality is eminently subjective? The answer is that it is possible, but not easy, because it is not easy to overcome the idealist-subjective temptation, and to do the work of pioneers.

The realist objective philosophical method is substantially the philosophical method of St Thomas, claimed by Gilson under the name “methodical realism” in order to contrast it to “methodical idealism”. But Gilson’s claim is purely historico-philosophical, without any attempt at application to historical reality. We instead will see shortly how such an application is possible.

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3. The data of experience

One of the fundamental canons of realist method is that of starting not from the “*cogito*” (under whatever form) but from “real, objective experience”, avoiding any nullification of this datum. This starting point is therefore neither the clear and distinct idea of Descartes, nor the transcendental category of Kant, nor the subjective experience of being in the existentialist sense, nor the idea of being, but “being”, understood first of all as existent, as “*actus essendi*”, not, however, in the

abstract, but as incarnated in the existent. 'Existing' in the abstract, like 'becoming' in the abstract, or like non-being (the nothing), "does not exist". It cannot therefore be the object of experience. The datum of immediate experience is that which is immediately present, as existent. It is "the immediate existent" that coincides with contingent being concretely existent and present to our senses and with them to our intelligence. This is the "datum of real, objective experience" of that singular philosopher that is the child, which allows it to know "being as the existent", together with the principle of identity (or non-contradiction), without the reduction of being to the phenomenon. The child, by a gift of nature, is born a "realist philosopher". This is its sapiential viaticum, something that acculturation will try to corrupt, so that the human being, born a realist philosopher, will live as an antirealist philosopher, and die culturally a sceptic (even if a believer, because he does not know how to justify his faith realistically, not even to himself).

Why? ... Because the philosophical undertow of modern culture, starting with Kant, is incurably antirealist. Kantian criticism consists substantially in reducing the datum of experience to the 'phenomenon', which in turn is reduced to merely subjective knowledge (the synthetic *a priori* judgment), relegating 'being' (the 'noumenon') to the realm of the unknowable. The inevitable consequence: once the real, objective experience of being has been truncated, all that is left is the experience of the phenomenon. We have become doubly enslaved: to our subjectivity as far as philosophical knowledge is concerned, and to phenomenism as far as scientific knowledge is concerned.

"Metaphysical realism" has become simply impossible. And so it remains, unless one returns to "the experience of being," rebelling against an experience limited to and suffocated in the phenomenon.

Is it possible to have such a rebellion that is both a revolution and a liberation? It is possible as well as necessary. We have to return to the "realist philosophical method", beginning from "the datum of experience" that has been reduced neither to the phenomenon nor to some subjective datum, but vindicated as authentic "experience of being". For us this amounts to saying: "realist method" starting from historical reality as "realist and objective datum of experience", as a most singular "experience of being" – of that most singular "being" that is precisely "historical reality".

4. From history to historical reality

Let us try to orientate ourselves. To speak of "history" is to speak of "subjectivity". Now we are accustomed to speak of history rather than of "historical reality": in the field of historiography, of philosophy (historicism), of politics, and today even in the field of religion (everything is reduced to the "history of salvation"). History demands a "phenomenology" (even if consisting of unrepeatable facts, seasoned perhaps by "values"). "Historical reality" instead demands a "being". The very difference in the two terms allows us to understand that the problem of history as historical reality, and therefore as "ontologico-metaphysical" problem, as the problem of the "being" of historical reality, has never been posed. Why? And who ought to have posed it? Obviously the realist philosophers. But let us come to the reasons why it has never been posed. These are basically three.

1) – In the past "history" never caused problems. Or, if it did "cause problems," it never raised the specific ontological problem about its own status as "historical reality". History exhausted itself in the category of "time", posing the problem of facts, of happenings, of the "meaning" of itself in the consequent search for the philosophy or theology of history. The "ontological problem" of history as "historical reality" thus remained unthinkable in the realm of realist philosophy.

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2) – Supposing it had been "thought", the passage from the historico-temporal categories of "fact" and "happening" to the ontological categories of historical reality raised a new philosophical problem that, for realist philosophy, was perhaps very arduous, beginning from the gnoseological aspect itself, because historical reality as such is beyond immediate experience. We do not have immediate experience of history as "historical reality", or of historical reality as "being", as that particular being that is historical reality. And how to reach that?

3) – Immediate experience being excluded, the difficulties multiply, literally blocking realist philosophy before the ontologico-metaphysical problem of historical reality. We can group these difficulties according to three levels:

- difficulties of a properly "historical" order,

VI. REALIST DYNAMIC METAPHYSICS AS CULTURAL MATRIX

1. Metaphysics and culture

There is a strict connection between metaphysics and culture, not only because metaphysics also is culture, but because it enjoys a cultural role that is very special. This is true above all in the case of dynamic metaphysics. To engage therefore in a long discourse on realist-dynamic metaphysics without speaking of this connection would be an unpardonable sin of omission. Such a discourse carries grave responsibilities that culminate in the matter of culture, whether at the theoretical or the practical level, even in relation to concrete realities that might seem to be quite remote from any metaphysics.

We have already said that metaphysics is like a mathematics of the spirit, while mathematics is like a metaphysics of matter. However, in order to avoid reducing metaphysics anti-realistically to a mathematics of the thinking brain, let us say that metaphysics is like a mathematics of the whole of human reality. And let us add that "dynamic metaphysics" is like the "higher mathematics" of such reality, imposing itself more and more ever since historical reality has become "dynamic". Hence the impact of metaphysics in the life of the human being, and therefore on "culture", which expresses the globality of human life as knowledge, value, civilization, making a properly human existence possible and human life livable.

If then the nexus between metaphysics and culture seems well-founded, there still remains the whole task of clarifying this nexus, especially in reference to the nexus between culture and realistdynamic

metaphysics, which is what directly interests us.

In its substance, this nexus can be clarified by saying that our metaphysics has the value of a "cultural matrix". But it is precisely this meaning and value that must be further clarified and demonstrated.

This calls for a triple clarification. The first regards culture itself. It is useless to speak of "cultural matrix" if we do not first clarify what is culture. But this is not enough, because, granted such clarification, we must take note of competing cultural matrices. It is knowledge of these and their differences that helps us understand realist-dynamic metaphysics as cultural matrix. But even this does not suffice, because we need to further define how realist-dynamic metaphysics must carry out its function of matrix.

Let us begin by explaining, in a realist manner, how it does this with regard to culture.

2. Three meanings of culture

In keeping with our aim, we prescind from erudite digression and limit ourselves to seeing in the "reality" of culture, or in culture not as concept but as concrete historical reality, three of its fundamental aspects that, as we have already said, are the following:

1. culture as "knowledge"
2. culture as "value" (or set of values), and
3. culture as "civilization".

We can express these in short as "culture-knowledge", "culture-value", and "culturecivilization".

We are not dealing with a triple cultural reality, or with three separate (or separable) aspects of culture, but with three constitutive components of culture itself, unfailing, always present and operative at least as long as a given culture prevails. What can vary is the play of combinations, their degree of intensity, their level, as also the matrix from which they derive and the quality of the cultural product which follows. It is the modality of the historical realization that changes. These are above all the events of history and society: because of these culture also changes, either remaining the matrix or else even changing the matrix itself.

If, paying a moment of attention to the words, we want to clarify the terms "culture" and "civilization", we can say that their meaning varies according to one's intellectual perspective,

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insofar as an idealist perspective can confer a more spiritual sense to culture (*Kultur*) and a more material sense to civilization (*Zivilisation*). "Culture" will then call to mind the cultured man, while civilization would call to mind the material level of development involved in technical and scientific progress. But in the traditional perspective the meaning of the two terms could also be the reverse, inasmuch as civilization might recall religious and human values, while culture, because of the dominance of science and in function of it, might allude to material progress, which in itself

that we have. But at this point there intervenes for us Christians the sophism, translated by now into an established slogan, that runs like this: “Christianity is not an ideology”. This sophism, thanks to the poor formulation of the problem and the ambiguity of the term “ideology”, is coined precisely to liquidate both theology (because – it is said – Christianity is life, is Faith, and not a “doctrine”) and Christian ideology, thus blocking ideology as true rationalized praxis and leaving the road open to false rationalized praxis.

12. Ideology and Christianity

It is true that Christianity is not an ideology, because it is a religion, and in fact the religion *par excellence*, the one true religion. It will never be therefore a profane rationalized praxis, not even through the distortion of the so-called “orthopraxis”. We are dealing with two different, heterogeneous realities, irreducible to each other: the “Christian religious reality” on the one hand, and “ideological praxis” on the other, which remains profane, lay, secular, even at the level of Christian ideology. Therefore it is dynontorganic ideology itself that will deny that it is a religious reality and affirm itself as an autonomous profane reality (according to Vatican II), under the competence and responsibility of the laity.

If therefore Christianity is not an ideology, and not even an equivocal surrogate for an ideology, we have one more reason for filling the “ideological gap” in the Catholic world by means of the true ideology, the true ideological praxis that is the dynontorganic one, without fear of further complicating things or setting in motion a new ideological trap.

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Truth alone can simplify the complications of error and block its disastrous consequences: but it must be a truth that identifies itself with a living, operative reality, in our case with “dynontorganic” rationalized praxis, and therefore with the “true ideology”.

As for the fear of a new ideological trap, we must keep in mind that it is false ideology that is enslaving; true ideology is actually liberating. And it is impossible that one transform itself into the other.

False ideology will remain incorrigibly false and evil. True ideology will remain true and beneficent: of that truth that is objective and incorruptible, that human beings can betray but not pervert.

The greater fear, besides, is not that true ideology might get corrupted, but the danger that it might be ignored and denied – unfortunately something that is already happening. A denial that turns out to be not only damaging to true ideology but also advantageous to false ideology.

We can get an idea of the foolishness and irresponsible blameworthiness that lies behind the betrayal in question, if we keep in mind that the ideologies as false and harmful rationalized praxis are the great danger to and the potential ruin of humanity; while ideology as true and beneficent rationalized praxis is the only valid profane hope that remains to us.

Christian religious hope is wonderful for our spiritual and eternal salvation (which is, evangelically, the one thing truly necessary). But, for the “profane historical salvation of the world”, no less necessary is the “hope” that is offered us by “ideology” as “true rationalized praxis”.

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- difficulties of a “metaphysical” order,
- difficulties of an “epistemological” order.

Let us briefly examine these difficulties.

5. The difficulties

1) – Historical difficulties.

A given reality, in order to transform itself into an immediate or reflexive datum of experience, should first of all “exist”. And here is the problem: since when has history been posited as historical reality with its own specific ontological importance, and since when has such a “historical reality”, with its specific ontological importance, become necessary to metaphysical reflection as an unavoidable “cultural demand”? The response cannot be completely univocal, because the analysis of historical reality finds itself before a “double historical reality”: that of “religious and Christian historical reality”, and that of “lay and secular historical reality”. The first presents itself in history as a historical reality with its own ontological importance as “the Mystical Body of Christ” from the very beginning, about two thousand years ago. This was in fact the datum of experience to be grasped and studied from that time onwards.

The second, the “lay and secular” historical reality, as a historical reality with its own ontological importance, presents itself in history from the time of the “Industrial Revolution” towards the end of the eighteenth century. It is therefore from that time, or at least from the first half of the nineteenth century, that this new historical reality must be taken as a datum of experience and subjected to an “ontologico-metaphysical study” as a “fundamental theme of realist modern philosophy”, beginning with Neo-Thomism and Neo-Scholasticism.

2) – Metaphysical difficulties.

But, even given such a sensibility, there arose a difficulty of the metaphysical order, consisting in the lack of a “specific ontological category” for interpreting historical reality. It is useless to search for it in the realist philosophical tradition, given that this philosophy never raised the problem. It is even more useless to search for it in the area of antirealist metaphysics. It was “the very historical reality itself that would suggest it”, to those obviously who knew to take the hint, with a work of research amounting to a discovery.

3) Epistemological difficulties.

The explanatory categories of the “new historical reality” posited at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution can be reduced mainly to the following:

- the idealist category of “dialectic” (Hegelian and Marxist);
- the naturalist and positivist category of “evolution”; and
- the realist category of “dynamic being”.

Each of these metaphysical categories was destined to produce a real “cultural revolution” as “matrices” of a new “culture-knowledge”. In fact, however, the cultural revolution was effected in function of the first two metaphysical categories (dialectic and evolution), and not of the third (dynamic being), because realist philosophy remained closed to the dynamic datum of experience in the past, and to the category of dynamic being in the present. This had a double negative consequence: the obsolescence of realist philosophy (which remained firmly medieval), and the

contamination of realist (= Christian) culture, “updated” in function of antirealist, if not anti-Christian, cultural matrices.

To accomplish today, in the present state of affairs, a “cultural revolution” in function of the realist category of “dynamic being”, becomes extremely difficult even for the Catholic world, insofar as it feels itself already “culturally reprogrammed”. This is the third difficulty that blocks the proper passage from the static to the dynamic, as “theoretical and practical passage from the old static-sacral historical reality to the new dynamic secular historical reality”. This is what we refer to as an “epistemological” difficulty, insofar as its overcoming involves the reversal of the old and new mentality and scientific conception.

Far from suppressing the problem, by their very importance the above mentioned difficulties force us to face it properly, beginning from the “datum of experience” that grounds it, which consists in the “ontological” passage from the static to the dynamic, thus grasping the historical reality of today: no longer static-sacral but dynamic-secular.

6. The Industrial Revolution and the ontological division of history

We have already insisted on the fact that the historical passage from the static to the dynamic, fruit of the Industrial Revolution, has not only a phenomenal value but also an “ontological” one. This amounts to saying that the Industrial Revolution effected an “ontological” division of history (and not merely a “chronological” one), dividing it into two “ontologically” different epochs: the one “before” it, with a “static-sacral” historical reality, and the one “after” it, with a “dynamicsecular”

historical reality. Two different historical epochs; two different worlds; two different series of societies; two “ontologically” different realities: this was (and is) the massive “datum of experience” of ontological (and not merely phenomenal) weight that imposed itself on the reflection of the thinker immersed in the concrete (and history is the synthesis of all concreteness), and in the very first place on the reflection of the realist philosopher. Accomodation to this epoch of “transition” while waiting for the “datum of experience” to work itself out in order to see its practically irreversible effects, without any decisive intervention, either theoretical or practical, was (and continues to be) the unforgiveable “*trahison des clercs*” of Christian extraction that the Church and the world are still paying for with a crisis of unprecedented gravity.

The only thing to do now is to make another attempt, taking note of the problem of the “new historical reality” and confronting it “realistically” first of all on the “ontologico-metaphysical” level. It is on this level that the new culture-knowledge has its starting point, as indispensable premise to a new culture-civilization. The datum of experience that grounds the ontologicometaphysical

study in question is paradoxically linked to the Industrial Revolution precisely as the factor distinguishing the two historical epochs and the corresponding ontologically different historical realities, the static-sacral and the dynamic-secular.

It is important to grasp (still at the level of experience) the different essential characteristics of these realities.

7. Different essential characteristics of the two historical realities

For the sake of brevity we reduce these essential characteristics to the following triads: “staticity”, “ethicity”, “sacrality” for the old preindustrial historical reality; “dynamism”, “onticity” and “secularity” for the new historical reality after the Industrial Revolution. We are referring here to the “profane” historical reality, “sacralized” in the preindustrial historical epoch, and “secularized” in the epoch after the Industrial Revolution, prescinding from the Christian religious reality which by its nature is “always ontologically sacred and dynamic”, but as such remains historically (not “mystically”!) outside the datum of experience.

A) Different essential characteristics of “static historical reality”

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1 – “Staticity”: ontologically it is (more exactly, was) a historical reality already complete, traditional, conservative, resistant to change, with a tendency to reorganization without problems of “construction” and of “future”.

2 – “Ethicity”. Because it was “static” (or perhaps because it was an already complete reality), the old historical reality with its corresponding society carried with it only an “ethical exigence” to “moralize” and “govern” (and to construct), by means of “morality” (in reference to consciences and customs) and of right (in reference to institutions).

3 – “Sacrality”. The ethicity borrowed its efficacy from “religion”, as “religious ethics”. There resulted a historical reality and a society “founded and animated directly by religion”: historical reality and society, therefore, of a “sacral” nature. Historical reality and “sacral” societies. Since preindustrial historical reality was by nature “static-sacral”, no preindustrial society could escape such a quality. Since it was static-sacral and therefore with an exclusively ethico-religioussacral

importance, the old historical reality with its corresponding society did not pose any new ontologico-metaphysical problem. The “ontology of static being” (= being whose real essence already is) was sufficient, even for the human being, whether in himself or in relation to society.

B) Different essential characteristics of “dynamic historical reality”.

These are the opposite of those of static historical reality:

1 – “Dynamism”. The Industrial Revolution affected the very foundations of the old static-sacral society, forcing humanity to “construct” a new society under the impulse of the new, dynamic

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it is obvious that the rationality of praxis places itself at the centre of ideology as rationalized praxis. And because such rationality can specify itself only in theist-spiritualist or atheist-materialist dynamic ideological rationality, it follows that ideology as rationalized praxis, and with it ideological praxis, has come to represent the great danger, or the only “profane” anchor of salvation, of this new world that has become dynamic. The meaning of dynontorganicity is illumined in relation to this anchor of salvation.

11. Ideology: the great danger and the only hope

Ideology is usually interpreted in such a negative sense as something that is congenitally wrong or meaningless or diabolically dangerous, as to render it object of a radical revulsion stemming from superficiality and ignorance. Only with difficulty is it understood in its identity with praxis, let alone rationalized praxis, and as quite distinct from what we have called para-ideology, pseudoideology,

utopia, and even sub-ideology.

The misunderstandings that follow, beginning from the well-known distinction of *Pacem in Terris* between ordinary doctrines and historical movements, cannot be counted, and lend themselves to the most contradictory moves. On the one hand, there are those who consider ideology as a nineteenth century phenomenon, historically dated or on the way to extinction because of its incurable crises. On the other hand there are those who distinguish badly between ideology (reduced to “doctrine”) and praxis (reduced to “method” or identified with a simple sociopolitical

fact), opening themselves to compromise and collaboration, and believing themselves to be immunized by recourse to mental restrictions or to Faith. Still others, pervaded by a type of obsessive fear, deny *a priori* any legitimacy to an ideological discourse on the part of Christians,

4 [Translating “*dover essere*”.]

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placing their psychological security in a strange ideological agnosticism or in an even stranger rejection of a hypothetical Christian ideology.

The consequence cannot but be that the way is left open to false ideologies (verbal recriminations are of no use) and closed instead to the true ideology. This is a story that has been repeating itself, by means of contradictory attitudes, for more than a hundred years. The damage that has followed and still follows is incalculable, because on the objective plane the “ideological situation” not only does not change, but becomes worse. “Ideology as rationalized praxis”, which is identical with the new profane dynamic historical reality grasped in its active aspect, is not only not on the way to being overcome, but instead imposes itself ever more drastically as insuppressible historical reality, which incarnates in itself the greatest theoretical and practical problem of the present and the future. On it depends the construction of the new secular dynamic society and with it the human-historical destiny of humanity.

In such a perspective, which is the only one objectively and realistically to be expected, ideology as rationalized praxis presents itself concretely as the “great danger”, and as “the only profane hope”: the great danger as “false” rationalized praxis, with its “false” rationality; the only profane hope as “true” rationalized praxis with its “true” rationality.

But the paradox in this: that, while the two false ideologies of liberal-capitalism secularism and Marxism have been present and operative in history for more than a century, “the true ideology”, as dynontorganic rationalized praxis, is very far from being so. Worse still, it is deliberately ignored and denied the right to exist precisely by those who should be supporting it and working towards its realization. Nor does the paradox stop here. While in actual fact (apart from useless verbal recriminations) one ends up by professing towards the “anti-Christian” ideologies and ideological praxis a conformistic ideological pacifism that results in passive acceptance and compromises, one professes at the same time an irrational and gratuitous aversion for that which should be the Christian ideology (“Christian” not because “confessional”, but simply because “true”).

The sophistic arguments for this kind of behaviour are many. They begin with a rejection of the word “ideology”, as if its meaning were so incurably linked to falsity and to the spirit of evil as to be unable to connote ideology as true rationalized praxis. If one insists on considering the word “ideology” as unredeemable, one has only to set it aside and pass on to rationalized praxis, because this is what matters and what imposes itself, as the great danger or as the only valid human hope

metaphysics, without any possibility of abstaining from choice. The rationality of praxis presses at the gates. If the “true” dynamic metaphysics does not open for it the proper door, a rationality of “false” and harmful praxis will continue to spread and rage through the door of false dynamic metaphysics.

10. The rational choice: dynontorganicity

We must therefore choose. And what will be the criterion of the choice? Even in the light of simple common sense, it is obvious that the criterion has to be “realist metaphysics”. The true dynamic metaphysics will therefore be that which is authentically “realist”: “realist-dynamic metaphysics”. And the “true rationality” of praxis will be the one discovered, indicated and deepened by it.

The “false” dynamic metaphysics, on the other hand, will be “antirealist”, whatever be its name or form. The ultimate consequences of philosophy are realized in it, uncovering its truth or falsity in relation to the rationality of praxis, which presents itself as the central theme of dynamic metaphysics and as the final theme of the whole philosophical system, without possibility of halting midway.

It is because of this that “immanentist dynamic metaphysics” and with it the whole course of philosophizing (even though only “crypto-immanentist” at the beginning – Descartes’ “cogito”, for instance –) gives rise inevitably to an “atheist-materialist rationality of praxis”; as, on the contrary, “realist-dynamic metaphysics”, in virtue of the inseparable transcendence of integral realism, necessarily gives rise to a “theist-spiritual” rationality of praxis, which is that which is genuinely “true”.

Praxis is in fact nothing but a “profane global dynamic humanism”, characterized as ideologically atheist-materialist or theist-spiritual precisely by the rationality of praxis, defined inexorably in one sense or the other by dynamic metaphysics.

“Realist-dynamic metaphysics”, therefore, defines the “true” rationality of praxis, because it is “true” dynamic metaphysics. And it defines it as a “theist-spiritual humanist rationality”. But,

46 beyond this transcendent definition, it “arrives” at its specific and concrete definition, one that clarifies the theist-spiritual humanist rationality of praxis as “dynontorganic rationality”. Thus the rationally true praxis is “dynontorganic praxis”. And the true ideology, as rationalized praxis, will be “dynontorganic ideology”.

What will be the “dynontorganicity” that formally characterizes dynontorganic ideology and praxis? It will be the true rationality of praxis, led to its definitive significance.

We have “nothing else” to say. But this is a “nothing else” with incommensurable meaning. The rationality of praxis, in fact, bears within itself the whole profane dynamic historical reality, with repercussions (positive or negative) on the Christian religious historical reality itself. If this is true, unfortunately, for the rationality of “false” praxis, it is also true, fortunately, for the rationality of “true” praxis, i.e., for “dynontorganicity”, which is the true rationality of praxis.

It is because of this its universal significance that the rationality of praxis represents (as we have been saying) a point of arrival and a point of departure. “Realist-dynamic metaphysics”, together with “dynontorganicity”, marks the point of arrival of the integral realist philosophical system. And with its “socio-political ideological outcome” in dynontorganic praxis it marks the point of departure for a new historical and cultural trajectory.

It is useless (and impossible) here to want to go deeper into dynontorganicity as the true rationality of praxis. It is enough to grasp well the metaphysical reason for it and its historical ideological significance. The reason for dynontorganicity as the true rationality of praxis is as follows: praxis, and with it the whole of profane dynamic historical reality, as also the new dynamic-secular society, are “dynontorganic by nature”; they are, therefore, in the depth of their being, “dynamic organism of ontological value”. It follows that “dynontorganicity”, as the true rationality of praxis, presents itself as their “has-to-be”⁴, almost like a genetic code governing their existence, their living and acting, their building up and development, given that there is a desire to be faithful to their “being”.

It is such dynontorganicity that represents the theist-spiritual ideological alternative to atheistmaterialist

ideological rationality, whether that of Marxism or of liberal-capitalist secularism.

historical reality. The new “dynamic” historical reality and the new “dynamic” society: this is the really revolutionary outcome of the Industrial Revolution. As “datum of experience”, the fact of the new historical reality and of the new dynamic society is already evident and incontrovertible, and represents perhaps the greatest problem of all times. The important thing is to grasp it well, understanding the “dynamism” not only as “change”, but as a new and unheard of “ontological character”. A “dynamic” historical reality and society is one that is not yet but is in the making, that “constructs” itself actively, in space and time. “Dynamism” is therefore to be understood not merely as change, but as active and passive “constructivity”.

2 – “Onticity”. Dynamism as constructivity (active and passive) finds itself in front of a historical reality and society that constitute themselves “in their being”. “Dynamism” combines therefore with “onticity”: it is by nature “ontic” and not merely “ethical” or phenomenal. It is this “ontic dynamicity” that postulates the “ontological category” of “dynamic being”, as “being” whose “real essence” is not yet, but is in the process of making itself, “actively constructing itself in space and time”. With the dynamic being there begins a new “ontological” (and not merely phenomenal) experience of being, which raises a “new ontological and metaphysical problem”: precisely that of dynamic being, the being that is at the basis of the new historical reality and of the new societies born of the Industrial Revolution.

3 – “Secularity”. This is the third essential characteristic of the new historical reality and of the new society after the Industrial Revolution. It consists in the “rejection” of religion, and with it of religious morality as the “foundation and soul” of society. If the new society and historical reality reject religion as their soul and foundation, it means that they have become “secular”, and secularity becomes synonymous with such a rejection. A rejection that is shocking but legitimate. Vatican II proclaimed the “autonomy” of terrestrial realities, which is to say the autonomy of profane historical reality and of the civil socio-political society which binds these together. “Autonomy” from what? From religion and religious ethics, and therefore the overcoming of “sacrality”. If the declaration of Vatican II is not merely a beautiful and pleasing turn of phrase but the truth, it follows that the rejection of religion as the soul and foundation of the new historical reality and of the new society is completely legitimate. But neither the one nor the other can subsist without a “soul and foundation”. What will this be? Here is the final observation, perhaps the most disconcerting of all: it will be “ideology” as “rationalized praxis”. Yes: it is the notorious ideology as rationalized praxis that has “substituted religion as the foundation and soul” of the new dynamic

10 secular society, for the simple reason that a “dynamic secular historical reality” and a “dynamic secular society” have need of a foundation and soul that is “dynamic and secular”. This soul and foundation is no longer religion, but “ideology as rationalized praxis”.

8. Conclusion

“To grasp the historical reality of today: no longer static-sacral, but dynamic and secular”. This is but the first awareness of a “new reality”, disturbing, revolutionary, extremely problematic and tremendously demanding. It presents itself as a massive “datum of experience” of “ontological” (and not merely ethical or phenomenal) value defined first and foremost by the “essential characteristics” of the new historical reality, that (in contrast to those of the old preindustrial historical reality) are “dynamism”, “onticity”, and “secularity”.

The historical upheaval produced by these characteristics, interpreted badly and applied in an even worse manner, has surpassed all imagination. And still it is from these that we must begin, not only to “understand”, but to “do” – things that are impossible without the mediation of a genuine “cultural revolution”.

II. CAPITALISM, MARXISM AND THEIR METAPHYSICAL VALUE

1. Capitalism and Marxism as historical realities

Capitalism and Marxism are neither philosophies, nor metaphysics, nor doctrines. They are not even therefore “ideologies”, if ideologies are reduced somehow to a “doctrine”. They are, in fact, historical realities that rightly or wrongly refer to a doctrine, but distinguish themselves sharply from it, just as the thing known (in terms of authentic realism) is distinguished from the thought in which it is known.

Nevertheless, the “objective historical reality” of capitalism and of Marxism cannot be thought without being known. Further: it cannot be “constructed” (presupposing that we are dealing with a reality to be constructed) without being known and thought. The “strict bond” between reality and thought, between theory and praxis (to use a Marxist terminology that can be adopted by all) should not however lead us to confuse or mix up the two, much less shift the “primacy of being” to thought. The primacy belongs to capitalism and Marxism as historical realities, and does not pass on to their theorizations.

To say, however, that “capitalism and Marxism” are historical realities and not “doctrines”, does not mean that they are not related to a doctrine, to their “theorization”, but that they are first and foremost a “historical reality” that as such imposes itself on “doctrine”.

It is not therefore capitalism and Marxism as historical realities that are to be measured against doctrine (even that contained in the sacred writings of Marx), but rather doctrine that is to be measured against the corresponding “historical reality”. In other words, it is not the theoreticians of capitalism or of Marxism (including Marx) that will prevail, but capitalism and Marxism as “historical realities” – even up to the point of having to say that it is not by studying Marx that one understands Marxism, but it is by “studying Marxism as a historical reality” that one understands Marx (even at the cost of denying him). This, among other things, is the first “norm” for looking at capitalism and Marxism with the realist spirit and method.

Placing ourselves, therefore, “realistically” in front of capitalism and Marxism as “historical realities”, the first question to ask will be the following: do they belong to “static” historical reality, or to “dynamic” historical reality? Here also the response must be made in function of the “Industrial Revolution”, which is the dividing line between the “static and dynamic” historical realities. And it will be made on the basis of the following criterion: capitalism and Marxism are “static” historical realities, if they precede the Industrial Revolution rather than proceed from it; they are “dynamic” historical realities if they follow that revolution and are produced by it.

2. Capitalism, Marxism and the Industrial Revolution

The terms “capitalism” and “Marxism” recall two formidable historical realities, but in different ways. The word “capitalism” recalls the corresponding historical reality, expressing in some way its content. The word “Marxism” recalls another historical reality (that of “socialism”), but names itself after its originating theorist, Karl Marx. What is important, however, is not “socialism” as seen by Marx, but “socialism as it imposed itself on history”, as it “transformed itself into a historical reality”.

And it is this that by and large goes under the name of Marxist socialism. So we look at Marxism also as a “historical reality”, placing Marx for the moment under brackets, at least as long as we are looking at Marxism as a “historical reality” and not as a theory. Now it is precisely capitalism and Marxism as “historical realities” that have a strict connection with the “Industrial Revolution”. This relationship can be summed up in a single phrase: they are its “products”. In other words, capitalism and Marxism as historical realities are inconceivable “before” the Industrial Revolution. They would never have existed and could not exist without it. They belong to the historical epoch “after” the Industrial Revolution. And they “occupy” this epoch completely. They have become the “historical reality” “after” the Industrial Revolution.

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They have become such as a matter of fact and not of right, because, being erroneous historical realities, it is obvious that we must at least raise the “hypothesis” of the “correct” historical reality. Why did this “correct” historical reality not emerge? Why has it, in its specificity, never even been attempted up to now? And if it had been attempted, what physiognomy, what character, what “name” would it have assumed?

Setting aside these questions, let us say only that “today” we would have had a “different”

ideological outcome” of the respective “dynamic metaphysics”, as discovering, theorizing and mobilizing (through their ideological outcome) the “rationality of praxis”.

But the problem is this: the internal “objective rationality” of praxis, which as such is “true” and equal for all, can in the passage from ontologico-dynamic truth to logico-dynamic truth translate itself into a “logical falsity” or a “false rationality” that nevertheless, thanks to praxis, can function magnificently, while the “true rationality” of praxis still remains to be discovered, reducing itself to an “inert truth”.

This is what has actually happened because of the absence of realist-dynamic metaphysics, and the non-emergence of the “true rationality” of praxis, with the consequent non-emergence of the “true” socio-political ideology that would construct the new “true” secular dynamic society. The “rationality” of praxis is therefore the “link” between “realist-dynamic metaphysics” (and dynamic metaphysics in general) and “socio-political reality”, as well the “explanation” of their socio-political ideological outcome. But the latter can, unfortunately, be the explanation either of “true” or of “false” “rationality”, depending on the dynamic metaphysics from which it originates.

9. The true and false rationality of praxis

The rationality of praxis (more exactly: its logico-metaphysical interpretation) depends neither on religion nor on morality, and much less is it manifested by Revelation. It is manifested rather (for better or worse) by a “dynamic metaphysics” which, however, in a certain sense assumes a function analogous to that of Revelation. Revelation manifests the rationality, or better the “religious super-rationality of the Faith”. Dynamic metaphysics manifests the profane rationality of praxis.

As we already know, the rationality of praxis, as its objective internal rationality or as an “ontologico-dynamic truth”, is immanent to praxis. But it is like a formidable energy that remains hidden and unusable (like nuclear energy, so long as it remains hidden and inert in the atom). “It should be discovered and made usable” by “dynamic metaphysics”. There lies the significance of the “socio-political ideological outcome” of the latter: discovering and making usable the formidable energy of praxis, which consists in its “rationality”.

Two consequences follow. The first is that the understanding of the “rationality of praxis” must be sought from “dynamic metaphysics” and not from Revelation which is completely silent in this regard. It is a question of a “profane ideological historical reality” (such is praxis and the rationality

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of praxis) that presents itself in the industrial historical epoch and that remains extraneous to the content of Revelation. Hence the inconsistency, among other things, of a “political theology”, whose central nucleus should be precisely the “rationality of praxis”.

As for “Christian social doctrine”, this could repeat, on grounds of ethical value, the rationality of praxis discovered and proposed by dynamic metaphysics, transferring it from the field of praxis to a field which is no longer its own, which is that of “values”, with the risk however of reducing its vigour and misunderstanding it. This is the risk of transforming “ideological” realities (including the rationality of praxis) into mere “para-ideological” values. Hence the necessity of integrating “Christian social doctrine” and “dynontorganic ideology”, not only so as not to empty out the latter into Christian para-ideologies, but to ideologically recycle “ethico-social values”, conferring on them a vigour and a clarity that they do not by themselves have, and which Christian social doctrine cannot give them.

But let us pass to the second consequence, even more important and relevant to our theme. It regards the “translation” of the rationality internal to praxis as its ontologico-dynamic truth, into logico-metaphysical rationality. Such translation depends totally and exclusively on the dynamic metaphysics which effects it, because of which the “rationality of praxis” “will be what dynamic metaphysics allows it to be”.

Hence the explosive significance of dynamic metaphysics itself, inasmuch as the rationality of praxis, and through it the whole of socio-political reality and the very future of the world, depend on it. In effect, depending on whether the “dynamic metaphysics” is true or false, the “rationality of praxis” will also be true or false, good or bad, constructive or destructive (immediate appearances to the contrary) of socio-political reality, triggering an irresistible historical process either towards salvation or towards perdition.

The crucial problem is therefore that of choosing between a “true” and a “false” dynamic

“internal objective rationality”, as is the case for any authentic being. Without the objective internal rationality that coincides with its ontological truth, being would be an absurd something that cannot be studied, because the absurd is the negation of rationality, and as such gives rise to neither knowledge nor science. It cannot be studied; it cannot even exist.

Now praxis is itself a “being”, even though of the “second grade”; it is “dynamic being” coinciding with profane dynamic historical reality itself seen in its active aspect. As “being” it possesses therefore its “ontological truth”, the “objective internal rationality” that makes it “rationalized praxis” and as such capable of being studied. What more, capable of being studied and to be studied as “being”, as “dynamic being”. Before being studied as phenomenology, it is to be studied in its ontologico-dynamic truth, in its objective internal dynamic rationality, above all at the metaphysical level.

It is this dynamic objective rationality internal to praxis (and obviously to its metaphysical study) that, precisely because it is “dynamic”, is destined to become the “key” to the constructivity of praxis and to the entire construction that derives from it. This corresponds in fact to the entire dynamic socio-political reality of today and to the socio-political action pertaining to it.

Everything is concentrated, therefore, in the so-called “rationality” of praxis as specific and primary object of research of every dynamic metaphysics, including realist-dynamic metaphysics. To discover the internal rationality of praxis, define it, theorize it metaphysically, transforming it from ontologico-dynamic truth into logico-dynamic truth, or into theory of praxis at the level of metaphysics, before doing so at the empirical level: this is the point that is both the point of arrival of realist-dynamic metaphysics and the starting point of praxis.

“Point of arrival” of metaphysics firstly, because, realistically, we do not reach “*a priori*” either at praxis or at the rationality of praxis, i.e., at the ontologically dynamic “active face” of dynamic historical reality. We reach it only “*a posteriori*”, passing through its “passive ontologico-dynamic face”, i.e., by studying historical reality as “dynamic being”. Once the “rationality of praxis” has been attained in this way, it is transformed from point of arrival into “starting point”, because thus the road of praxis and of the theory of praxis remains open in all its aspects.

The outcome of realist-dynamic metaphysics, therefore, is first of all its outcome in the “rationality” of dynamic historical reality and of its active aspect. And dealing with “profane” dynamic historical reality, as in our case, its outcome defines itself as an “outcome in the rationality of praxis”, or as an outcome in “rationalized praxis,” which opens the way to “ideology” understood as rationalized and theorized praxis constructive of the new secular dynamic reality.

Thus the outcome of realist-dynamic metaphysics, in reference to dynamic-profane historical reality, becomes an “ideological outcome”. And because ideology as rationalized praxis is by 44

definition socio-political ideology, the outcome of realist-dynamic metaphysics becomes, in virtue of the rationality of praxis, its “socio-political ideological” outcome.

The outcome, therefore, of realist-dynamic metaphysics in relation to profane dynamic historical reality is a socio-political ideological one, “centred on the internal objective rationality of praxis and justified by it”.

8. The internal rationality of praxis and its importance

The internal objective rationality of praxis, because of its ontologico-dynamic socio-political value, comes to represent the quintessence of dynamic socio-political reality, of the theory of praxis, of socio-political action, and of the socio-political historical process. There is no better justification of the socio-political outcome of realist-dynamic metaphysics, and of any “dynamic” metaphysics whatsoever, regardless of its importance. The reason is that the construction of that “universe within the universe” which is profane dynamic historical reality and the global secular dynamic society that synthesizes it, depends on the socio-political ideological outcome of dynamic metaphysics.

If we want experience to confirm this, it is enough to look at this construction, to note that in the last hundred years the above mentioned “universe” has been constructed and continues to be constructed in function of two “rationalities” of praxis (the liberal-capitalist and the Marxist), corresponding to the respective ideologies as praxis that is rationalized, theorized and mobilized in the construction of the new secular dynamic society. And this has been done in virtue of the “sociopolitical

world, a “different” society, a “different” culture. Let us instead examine capitalism and Marxism as historical realities “after” the Industrial Revolution, as its products. Let us first try to get a better understanding of them as “historical realities” and work out an account of their genesis, without attempting as yet to evaluate them.

3. Capitalism and Marxism as historical realities

The “four adjectives” that characterize capitalism and Marxism as historical realities could be the following: “dynamic”, “ontic”, “global”, and “socializing”. Let us examine each of these briefly.

1) First of all, “dynamic historical reality”. The Industrial Revolution is the watershed between the old “static-sacral” historical reality and the new “secular dynamic” historical reality. The latter is “dynamic” in the sense of a “reality that constitutes itself continually” and actively in space and time. It is “secular” in the sense that it rejects religion as its soul and foundation.

It is more than evident that capitalism and Marxism are “secular” historical realities, whether as matter of fact or as formally rejecting religion as their soul and foundation. It is equally clear that they are also “dynamic” realities, not merely in the sense of “change” but of “construction”, in the sense of a new historical reality that continually constitutes itself by means of activities in space and time. Capitalism and Marxism therefore “qualify” to be properly called “dynamic” historical realities.

2) Dynamic historical realities that are “ontic”, or of ontological value, and therefore “onticdynamic” and not simply ethico-dynamic or dynamic-phenomenal. For those who are able to understand capitalism and Marxism realistically, there is no doubt that they present themselves as two massive historical “realities” with their own proper ontic consistency, in the sense that they have posited (and continue to posit) a “new being” in existence: the being, precisely, of the historical realities of capitalism and Marxism.

This, which is a matter of fact, remains true even if the “theorists” of capitalism and of Marxism reject it (being antirealists) and the very “critics” of capitalism and Marxism (even if realists) do not take it into account, making the strangest “reductions” of both: reductions that are ethical, economic, socio-political, phenomenal, doctrinal. There is no doubt, therefore, that capitalism and Marxism are two “historical realities” with their own “ontic consistency”. It is this “dynamic onticity” that is the secret of their strength.

3) “Global” ontico-dynamic historical realities.

Capitalism and Marxism (as Marxist socialism) cannot concretely be reduced to economic fact, to capitalist economy on the one hand and collectivist economy on the other. Instead, they affect the whole of historical reality, including (even if only negatively) that of religion. They are “global” historical realities. This also forms part of the “datum of experience”.

“Globality” as a datum of experience is born of the “dynamic onticity” of capitalism and Marxism as ontico-dynamic historical realities, because dynamic onticity involves “synthesis and concreteness”. It is a construct that involves the whole of dynamic historical reality, in whatever way this happens: in function of a capitalist economy, or of a collectivist economy, or in some other way. Precisely because they are ontico-dynamic historical realities, therefore, capitalism and Marxism are also “global” ontico-dynamic historical realities, because in their “construction” they involve the whole of historical reality.

4) “Socializing” global ontico-dynamic historical reality

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This fourth and final qualification tries to indicate that the “global ontico-dynamic” historical reality of capitalism and Marxism has a well-defined function and an outcome that cannot be contained: both of them are concretized in the construction of a new society, through an unstoppable socializing process, either capitalist or Marxist. This is the significance of capitalism and Marxism as socializing historical realities: “socializing”, because “constructive of a new society” at the highest level of “socialization”, even if the latter is understood only as “growing interdependence”.

But the socialization that emerges from the “socializing” property of capitalism and Marxism goes well beyond its ethical and phenomenal aspect. This socializing property is by nature onticodynamic,

and the socialization that follows from it is to be understood in an “ontico-dynamic”

sense. It is the transformation of being, “construction of a new being” (of a new historical reality, of a new society), whose socializing thrust moves in the direction of a “unified global historical reality”.

Compared to this thrust and this “ontico-dynamic” socialization, the thrust and socialization of the merely “ethical” appears weak and fragile. It neither socializes nor remedies the problems of the false ontico-dynamic socialization of capitalism and of Marxism. It remains outside of history, which, as the new global and socializing ontico-dynamic historical reality in the ontic dynamic sense, demands a socialization that is not simply ethical but ontico-dynamic.

4. Capitalism and Marxism as rationalized praxis

Having outlined the four qualities of capitalism and Marxism as ontico-dynamic global socializing historical realities, let us pass on to an evaluation. This is still a question of an “ontic” judgment of value, because the first “value” is the “ontological value of being”, of the true being of a thing, and not the “ethical” values (or disvalues) that pertain to it.

The “ontological value” of a thing is given by the correct response to the question: “What is it?”

Let us therefore ask ourselves: what is capitalism, ontologically speaking? What is Marxism? These are questions that involve metaphysical reflection. And their answers lead us into the ontologicometaphysical

“sanctuary” of capitalism and Marxism, allowing us to study them from within.

Let us begin directly with the answer that interests us: capitalism and Marxism are “rationalized praxis”. Now rationalized praxis can be called, and is, ideology as “rationalized praxis”. Such an identification is authorized (and even imposed) not just by current terminology or by the media, but by reality. Grasped in its reality, without stopping at the usage of the word that remains outside of reality, “ideology” is rationalized praxis, and rationalized praxis is ideology as reality, something that precedes ideology as “theory”, realistically holding primacy over the latter: “first reality, then theory”.

Turning to the “what is it” of capitalism and Marxism, we can say therefore that they are “the two great ideologies as rationalized praxis” that have dominated the world scene for a hundred years and will continue to dominate it so long as they are not pushed aside by a “third ideology with its rationalized praxis” that imposes itself as a new and different “ontico-dynamic global socializing” historical reality for the construction of a different world and society.

Let us prescind for the moment from the third (or “alternative”) ideology and pause at the keyelement

of the whole argument, which is that of rationalized praxis. Let us define it in these terms:

“rationalized praxis is ontico-dynamic global socializing historical reality itself, grasped in its inner rationality” and considered in its “active aspect”, with its function of constructing a new dynamic secular society.

“Rationalized praxis” is therefore the same as historical reality that has become dynamic thanks to the Industrial Revolution; it expresses the “active aspect” of historical reality. Ontico-dynamic historical reality is, in fact, like a medal with two faces: the face that is “in construction” and the “active” face, inseparable because expressions of the same reality, but formally distinct, because one is the “dynamic society” that is being built up, and the other is the “constructive praxis” pertinent to it.

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“Praxis” understood in this way, written into secular historical reality and itself “secular”, enjoys its own “inner rationality”, which redeems it from the state of “crude energy”, translating it into rationalized praxis. It is this “inner rationality” of praxis that is the nodal point of ideology as rationalized praxis, and therefore of capitalism and Marxism as true and proper ideologies.

5. The inner rationality of praxis

Affected as we are by subjectivism, we are accustomed to relegating rationality to our brains, almost forgetting that rationality exists first of all “in things”. Without the rationality of things, science would be impossible. “The real is the rational”, because it enjoys an internal rationality, something that our intelligence can and in fact must attain, if it wants to know and to operate. The internal rationality of things is the first postulate of realism. And if one is a realist, one must recognize this also of “praxis”, given that it also is an “objective reality”, something that cannot be reduced to the subject.

doctrine before Vatican II, and also after it, in so far as it continues to ignore dynamic historical reality as such).

Being of an “ethical” nature, para-ideology is necessarily linked to religion and morality (whether Christian or secular) giving rise to two series of para-ideologies: “para-ideologies with a religious matrix” (or ethico-religious, or even Christian ethico-personalist), and “para-ideologies with a secular matrix” (the Enlightenment, non-Marxist socialism, political liberalism).

Now realist-dynamic metaphysics cannot have a “para-ideological” socio-political outcome because it is neither a religion nor a morality. It is an “ontologico-dynamic metaphysics” whose socio-political outcome cannot but be an ontologico-dynamic one, which is in fact the real ideological outcome.

“Pseudo-ideology” is a complex of myths and violence that can represent the climax of irrationalism. Typical cases: Nazism, Fascism, the extremisms (consisting of myths and violence) of the Right and the Left. Not only can realist-dynamic metaphysics not have a “pseudoideological” outcome, but it is the most radical negation of the pseudo-ideologies, because it represents the supreme exigence of “socio-political rationality” in contrast to any irrationalism or pseudo-rationality whatsoever. We might note further that the pseudo-ideologies are still governed by a “static” conception of history: this is what creates the illusion and the presumption of having to change it with violence, in the service of some myth or the other.

“Socio-political utopia” is nothing but a “para-ideology” seen as an ideal and projected on to the future. It inevitably carries within itself the inconsistency of a double evasion of reality: an evasion in the ideal and an evasion in the future. Dynamic realist metaphysics, therefore, with its exigence of realism and concreteness, implies the most radical reversal of utopia. Its socio-political outcome is, in fact, the realization of the future in the present, in virtue of the permanent ideological sociopolitical

construction, which excludes any ideal utopistic flight into the future. Utopia as “hope”, beyond the purely psychological fact, is substituted rather well by the “realist-dynamic constructive commitment” that realist-dynamic metaphysics instills into its socio-political outcome.

“Socio-political ministry” represents today the postconciliar prolongation of Christian social doctrine as adaptation to the new dynamic situation, centred around “human promotion”.

Sociopolitical

ministry as human promotion and realist-dynamic metaphysics of profane dynamic historical reality run on two different tracks (that of “evangelization” and that of ideology), making impossible any direct pastoral outcome on the part of the above mentioned metaphysics. Yet its contribution to the ministry of human promotion, through “ideological mediation”, can be incalculable. Everything depends on its socio-political outcome precisely as “ideological” sociopolitical

outcome.

What remains is the “political game for its own sake”. Only realist-dynamic metaphysics can eliminate this, in virtue of its “ideological” socio-political outcome as its only possible outcome,

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and by the impossibility of reducing the ideological socio-political outcome to a purely political game.

At the sub-ideological level, at the level, that is, of “sub-ideology” as incarnation of ideology in the concrete and contingent political reality, the political game remains inevitable in a democratic regime. This will not, however, any longer be a self-enclosed political game, but rather a political game at the service of its own ideological praxis.

“Ideology, sub-ideology, para-ideology, pseudo-ideology, ministry, political game”: all things to be distinguished, in order to give some seriousness to the ideological discussion and to the semantics pertaining to it, and to “centre” the socio-political outcome of realist-dynamic metaphysics in “ideology” in the strict sense as “rationalized praxis”.

7. The internal rationality of praxis and realist-dynamic metaphysics

The socio-political reality of today coincides with profane dynamic historical reality, and synthesizes itself in the new global secular dynamic society, “constructed” by praxis that is rationalized, theorized and mobilized.

Such praxis is characterized first of all as “rationalized praxis” because it possesses its own

domination of nature), but in a “realist-dynamic” context which is that of the *ideological animation of praxis* for the construction of history.

5. Definitions of ideology

The enormously complex reality of ideology, therefore, could well give rise to different definitions of itself, according to different points of view and the articulation of the argument, but always coherent and univocal ones. Let us focus on the following three.

1) Ideology as “global profane ontologico-dynamic reality”, seen as “praxis”. This is the definition already given: ideology is rationalized praxis, theorized and mobilized, constructive of the new secular dynamic historical reality. It is ideology as reality present and operative in history today, in its secular liberal-capitalist and social-communist atheist-materialist versions. This definition, which takes ideology as reality, has ontologico-dynamic value.

2) Ideology as the “ontologico-dynamic soul” of praxis. Ideology is the ontological and dynamic “soul” of praxis. This definition recalls the distinction of soul and body, form and matter (understood in a realist philosophical sense). It has “formal” value.

3) Ideology as “theory of praxis”. Ideology is the “theory” of praxis. This expression defines the meaning of ideology as a “logical” category, and has a gnoseological value. The important thing is to keep in mind that we are dealing with a “logico-dynamic” category, which as such is not separable from the corresponding “ontologico-dynamic” category, because it synthesizes with it, and must do so. In effect it is the logical category of ideology that must be reabsorbed into its ontologico-dynamic category, and not vice versa, lest ideology as an ontologico-dynamic category be emptied out into its logical category.

Something analogous is seen in the case of “religious belief” (logico-dynamic category of faith) with respect to Faith as an “ontologico-dynamic” religious category. It is religious belief (= logical category) that must be incorporated into Faith and not vice versa, something that would reduce Faith to a theological doctrine.

The clarifications of ideology as rationalized praxis are of extreme importance for the “sociopolitical ideological outcome” of realist-dynamic metaphysics. This outcome, in fact, is only possible in “ideology” as “rationalized praxis”.

6. Realist-dynamic metaphysics and its ideological outcome

Given the realist clarification of ideology, to speak of the “ideological outcome” of realistdynamic metaphysics is to think of a rather precise outcome that will be “socio-political” in the measure that it will be ideological. The “socio-political” reality of today, in the present dynamicsecular

historical context, raises in the first place the problem of itself as an ideological problem, and it is in this sense that the socio-political reality relates to realist-dynamic metaphysics and vice versa.

But socio-political reality, besides raising the problem of itself as an ideological problem in the strict sense, can also give rise (with or without reason) to the problem of itself as a problem that is 42

para-ideological, pseudo-ideological, utopian or pastoral, even to the point of reducing itself to a purely political game.

This requires that the “socio-political outcome” of realist-dynamic metaphysics be fixed in the clearest possible terms. “Positively” the clarification is that which has already been given: it is a question of an “ideological” socio-political outcome. “Negatively” it is a question of excluding every other direct socio-political outcome, such as the “para-ideological, pseudo-ideological, utopian, pastoral”, up to the point of radical exclusion of the “political game” itself.

Such exclusions must be justified, and this involves a clear distinction between ideology and other categories more or less akin to it. Let us examine the difference by studying other definitions; this will serve to clarify the distinction.

“Para-ideology” is nothing but a set of ethical exigences and norms that expresses itself in a “doctrine” and operates through the moral conscience, through the person. Para-ideology largely ignores dynamic historical reality, placing itself outside (or before or above) it. Para-ideology was therefore able to exist even before the Industrial Revolution (typical case: the Enlightenment paraideology),

or by prescinding formally from it (typical case: the para-ideology of Christian social

Now praxis as “historico-dynamic reality” is precisely such a historical-objective reality, something that cannot be reduced to the human subject. As such it also possesses its own internal rationality that makes it “rationalized praxis”. It does not matter that these assertions do not yet form part of our cultural tradition. They will never do so as long as we do not discover the “ontological role” of the Industrial Revolution, and as long as this is not inserted into the history of philosophy as an essential theme of modern philosophy.

The Industrial Revolution marks, in fact, the beginning of a “new creation” (in the profane sense), consisting of the “new ontico-dynamic reality” centred on the new “dynamic and secular society” in continuous construction, and in the “rationalized praxis” that constructs it. This is the “new thematic” (without excluding the old one) of a modern realist philosophy, and it of interest to philosophical reflection at all levels, from the highest “metaphysical” level, to the final levels of “applied” philosophy.

But let us turn to the internal rationality of praxis and of the new ontico-dynamic historical reality. Such rationality, like every other objective rationality internal to things, corresponds to their “true nature”, is a constitutive part of them, and guarantees their proper line of operation. This is true also of praxis. It operates, and should operate, according to its own “objective internal rationality” that corresponds to its true nature as praxis constructive of the new dynamic secular society, and to the true nature of the dynamic secular society that is being constructed, that “must” be constructed in harmony with its “proper nature”, under pain of the inevitable prospect of the underlying catastrophe of every construction that is “against nature”.

It is such rationality that makes praxis a “rationalized praxis”, conferring on it a singular “metaphysical weight”, and at the same time imposing on it the necessity of a “theorization” that would render it properly “operative”. Let us see how.

6. Capitalism and Marxism as rationalized and theorized praxis

As we have just said, it is the rationality internal to praxis that confers on “rationalized praxis” its metaphysical import. Where there is rationalized praxis, therefore, there is “metaphysical” import, and this will be proportionate to the ontological value of praxis itself, which coincides ontologically with the new ontico-dynamic historical reality. On the basis of this coincidence, the metaphysical import of rationalized praxis appears formidable: it is the same as that of the new ontico-dynamic historical reality.

It is this “rationalized praxis” that confers on capitalism and Marxism, as rationalized praxis, their metaphysical import, imposing at the same time the necessity of a “dynamic metaphysical key” as indispensable instrument of their “theorization” at all levels, so that they become, “ontologically”, “rationalized praxis”, and logically, “theorized praxis”. Rationalized praxis, because they are ontico-dynamic historical realities; theorized praxis, because it is their theorization that makes capitalism and Marxism actually comprehensible and operative.

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This completes the “ideological definition” of capitalism and Marxism: as ideologies, they “are rationalized and theorized praxis”. They are the two great ideologies, if ideology is understood as rationalized and theorized praxis. They claim an exclusive right to this title, even though they are false, because in fact there does not exist a true ideology in terms of rationalized and theorized praxis according to the correct objective rationality “internal” to the new dynamic historical reality, as well as to the praxis that expresses its active aspect, and to the new dynamic society to be constructed according to its true nature, its authentic “ontological ‘has-to-be’”¹ (which is prior to its ethical nature). “Ontological nature” that is neither capitalist nor Marxist, but ontico-dynamic and authentically “realist”, and because realist, also, we can add, “Christian”.

In one word, capitalism and Marxism as rationalized and theorized praxis are the only two ideologies present and operative in history, because of the lack of a “Christian” ideology. This lack is the greatest sin of omission on the part of Christianity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the Church and the world are paying for it with the gravest crisis in their history.

If therefore capitalism and Marxism are “rationalized and theorized praxis”, and because of this assume a specific “metaphysical value”, we must take proper note of this metaphysical value, which is “essentially twofold”: metaphysical value as ontologico-metaphysical relevance, and metaphysical value as “metaphysical theorization”, on the basis of “metaphysical premise”, “essential penetration”, and cultural animation.

7. Ontologico-metaphysical import of capitalism and Marxism

The metaphysical import of capitalism and Marxism is therefore the same as that of rationalized praxis, because they are “rationalized praxis”. And because rationalized praxis coincides with the new historico-dynamic reality, their metaphysical import is the same as that of the new dynamic historical reality. Now the new dynamic historical reality is not merely ethical and phenomenal but ontico-dynamic.

Its metaphysical import is more specifically therefore an “ontologico-metaphysical” import. And this is the metaphysical relevance of capitalism and Marxism: “ontologico-metaphysical”. This is the “realist-objective” datum”, at their expense. And thus it remains, even when it is “betrayed” on the level of theorization. This will be the “betrayal of being”, which in this case reaches its metaphysical culmination in the reduction of ontico-dynamic historical reality to “historical becoming” (Hegel).

This antirealistic reduction of ontico-dynamic historical reality to “historical becoming” is at the same time injurious to the “internal rationality” of praxis. This internal rationality is itself an objective internal rationality with “ontologico-metaphysical import”, adequating itself to the ontologico-metaphysical relevance of a historical reality that is not yet reduced to “historical becoming” but grasped in its ontico-dynamic consistency. Idealist becoming is one thing, and “realist” ontico-dynamic reality is another. We can have an idea of the disasters following in the wake of the “betrayal of being” by the new ontico-dynamic historical reality and praxis, if we keep sufficiently in mind their ontologico-metaphysical import. The “being” of the new ontico-dynamic historical reality and of praxis embraces not only the historical universe but the entire universe, in so far as ontico-dynamic historical reality can be “one” “ontologico-dynamic” synthesis of it: a “profane” ontologico-dynamic” synthesis that is praxis, and that becomes operative as praxis. Nothing, therefore, escapes the “ontologico-metaphysical import” of praxis, neither religion, nor nature, nor man, nor society, nor the State. “Everything” participates in the “objective internal rationality” of the “ontologico-dynamic synthesis” emerging from the new ontico-dynamic historical reality as praxis, either enriching itself or becoming impoverished if not destroyed. The outcome will depend on the “metaphysical theorization” of rationalized praxis, and therefore on the “translation of its ontologico-metaphysical rationality”, by nature “positive”, into “logicometaphysical theory” that itself can turn out to be either “positive” or extremely “negative”.

1 [Translating “dover essere ontologico”.]

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“*Corruptio optimi, pessima*”, runs an old proverb. This is applicable to the “metaphysical theorization” of praxis that presides over praxis. “Rationalized praxis”, and therefore onticodynamic historical reality understood in its authentic “objective internal rationality”, is the best one can expect. “Theorized praxis”, and therefore the “theory of praxis” that renders it present and operative in history, can be worse than one can imagine.

This is a consequence of the “metaphysical value” of “rationalized and theorized praxis”. Rationalized praxis has a universal ontologico-metaphysical import. It encompasses the entire universe. It is “totalizing”. If therefore it is “well theorized metaphysically”, we will have a “metaphysical theorization” that “totalizes the good”; if not, we will have a metaphysical theorization that “totalizes evil”. It is not possible to stop midway. This would be “antimetaphysical”; it would amount to putting oneself in opposition to the ontico-dynamic historical reality and with its metaphysical “dynamic”, whose Alpha and Omega is the “Absolute”, and a “totalizing Absolute” in fact.

This explains why ideology as “rationalized and theorized praxis” is “dogmatic” and “totalizing”, whether for “good” or “evil”. It depends on the ontologico-metaphysical import of rationalized praxis, translating itself necessarily, if theorized, into a “logico-metaphysical theory of absolute and totalizing value” without being able to stop half way. Thus one arrives either at an “ideologico-theo-spiritual totalizing Absolute”, or at an “ideologico-atheist-materialist totalizing Absolute”. This is the “ontologico-metaphysical” import of rationalized praxis as ontico-dynamic historical reality that remains available to and is participated in by every “ideology” as “rationalized and theorized praxis”. Such is therefore the “metaphysical value” also of capitalism and Marxism. Only when we reach this metaphysical value do we place our hands on their guiding

therefore in praxis. But even this is not enough, because praxis does not halt at the actions of person-cells, nor is it their “sum total”. Praxis, in fact, as “life-action of dynontorganism”, “transforms the actions of person-cells into a new reality” (= the reality of praxis), which is far more than their sum total, whether as reality or as potency.

Praxis is itself “ontico-dynamic reality”, no longer reducible to “personal action” or “action of the group”. As far as “potency” is concerned, the potency of praxis is immensely superior to the potency of the action of persons or of the group, and of any sum total of these. It is enough to attend to the data of experience. Anyone who continues to insist on merely personal or group actions and not on praxis is betting on a losing horse.

4. Ideology as rationalized praxis

Having grasped the reality of praxis as the life-action of dynontorganism or as profane dynamic historical reality itself seen in its active aspect, it is possible to pass to the proper understanding of “ideology” precisely as “rationalized praxis, theorized and mobilized for the construction of the new secular dynamic society”.

Ideology understood in this way is identical with praxis, and therefore firstly with a “reality”.

The first consequence is that ideology is no longer reducible to a doctrine.

It is “rationalized praxis”. It is praxis equipped with its own internal rationality with ontological value, like every authentic being. Later we can have (in fact, we should have) the entry also of doctrine, “theory”, resulting in a transformation into “rationalized and theorized praxis”. The whole cycle of rationalized and theorized praxis, constructive of the new dynamic society, will complete itself in its “mobilization”.

Ideology understood in this way, corresponding to its complex reality, resolves into an “ontologico-logico-operative reality” which makes the term ambiguous, inasmuch as the word “ideology” can mean

- rationalized praxis as “reality”;

- “theory” of rationalized praxis; and

- rationalized praxis that is theorized and mobilized (operative sense).

Let us prescind from the different meanings that make (in the pejorative sense) the word “ideology” synonymous with anything, including theology, disqualified thus as an “ideology” damaging to the “faith” (except perhaps by professing, instead, a “political theology”!). And let us refer the word “ideology” only to “profane dynamic global socio-political reality”, and therefore to profane dynamic historical reality considered in its active aspect of praxis constructive of the new secular dynamic society (which represents a minimum of semantic coherence).

Let us note now that praxis becomes actually “constructive” of secular dynamic society inasmuch as it possesses its own “internal objective rationality”, which must be “theorized” so that praxis can be “mobilized and governed in its constructive process”. Hence the “global dynamic and synthetic real meaning” of ideology as “rationalized praxis, theorized and mobilized”, constructive of the new dynamic-secular society.

This is an unequivocal definition of ideology in a global, synthetic-dynamic, operative and constructive “realist sense”. Ideology operates, constructs, because it is praxis and theory of praxis, it is for praxis, inseparable from praxis just as the soul is not separable from the body, except by reducing it to a cadaver or a monster.

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“Ideology” understood thus represents a “new ontological and logical category of dynamic nature”, unthinkable apart from profane dynamic historical reality, identifying itself with such historical reality as praxis, and accentuating its internal rationality as also the necessary theorization, precisely in order that praxis might be really “constructive”. The word “ideology” thus understood realistically and dynamically is the negation of the Cartesian static and abstract clear and distinct idea, such as “simple nature”, because it is “dynamic reality” with its internal rationality and corresponding theorization. It is this theorization that allows the definition of ideology also as “theory of praxis”, transforming it from a dynamic-ontological category to a logico-dynamic category.

But ideology itself as “theory of praxis”, and therefore as logical category, maintains its authentic ideological meaning only on condition that it remain a “logico-dynamic” category, manouevring itself not in a Cartesian epistemological context (which is that of science for the

local bodies, cities, neighbourhoods, etc.). But “dynontorganism” (at the supreme level, and subsequently also at the subaltern levels) must be properly analysed, in order to be understood and in order to understand its “praxis”.

The fundamental analysis of it, which becomes the key to the whole ideological and sociopolitical discussion, consists in being able to grasp the two sides of dynontorganism itself: “the ontico-dynamic face” and the “active face”. Dynontorganism presents itself as a medal with two faces. To grasp these, it is enough to keep in mind its definition: “dynontorganism is a complex reality, animated by a vital principle, and therefore capable of living and acting on its own, constituting itself actively in space and time in a coherent and univocal sense”.

Dynontorganism, therefore, is first of all a “complex reality”: so complex that at the supreme level it comprises the whole of profane dynamic historical reality (we refer now to this latter, and prescinding from Christian religious historical reality). This profane dynamic historical reality, precisely because it is “dynamic”, has to be constructed, giving rise to the first face of dynontorganism, the “passive ontico-dynamic” face. This passive ontico-dynamic “face” of dynontorganism, in reality, identifies itself with dynontorganism itself in so far as it is being constituted. The two faces of a medal do not exist in isolation, they are the same medal seen from one side or the other.

But in order to be built up, dynontorganism has need of the activity of all its members, of all the person-cells, organized in dynontorganism and in the many subaltern dynontorganisms or even agents with their own initiatives: initiatives, however, always of the person-cell, and not of an “autonomous and sovereign human person” reduced to an Enlightenment abstraction and amounting to a negation of dynontorganism.

This active constitution of dynontorganism represents the second face of the medal: its “constructive active face”. We have completed the fundamental analysis of dynontorganism, as well as its image, which is an image with two faces: “the passive ontico-dynamic face”, and the “constructive active face”.

It is important to note what follows: both the faces have an ontico-dynamic value, because they are the same dynontorganism seen in its two valences, active and passive. Identifying themselves with the dynontorganism itself, the two valences belong to it, including the active-constructive valence, which expresses the activity not of the autonomous and sovereign human person reduced to himself, but of the dynontorganism, which however reveals itself in the quality of super-agent that “constitutes itself”, thus giving rise to praxis.

3. Praxis

Having grasped the two faces of dynontorganism and of dynamic historical reality through an elementary analysis, we must now turn our attention to the “face” that interests us, which is the “active” constructive one, and begin to give it a name.

Let us call it “praxis”. The word “praxis” therefore recalls the active-constructive face of dynontorganism, taking on a very precise meaning that is expressed by two definitions, one referring directly to dynamic historical reality, the other to dynontorganism.

- The first definition is the following: “praxis is profane dynamic historical reality itself taken in its active aspect”.

- The second definition is formulated thus: “praxis is the very life-action of dynontorganism”.

The two definitions are synonymous, but the first recalls historical reality as “praxis” (Marx).

The second focuses on praxis in dynontorganism. It is important to note two things which are normally taken for granted. First: praxis “always has an ontological value” because it is identical to

40 historical reality, to dynontorganism, expressing its active aspect. Second: praxis “is an activism” that does not belong any longer to “the autonomous and sovereign person” but to dynontorganism; it is the “life-action” of dynontorganism, which, if it is authentic “dynamic organism with ontological value” (= being of the second grade), must also have its life-action.

One might ask: but is this not given to them by persons? Yes and no! No, because “autonomous and sovereign human persons” give nothing to dynontorganism because of the fact that they negate it and themselves as person-cells. Yes, because person-cells, entering the ontological texture of dynontorganism, “re-found” their own life and action in the life-action of dynontorganism itself and

threads. +++

We have said earlier that the metaphysical value of capitalism and of Marxism is substantially twofold, as “ontologico-metaphysical import” and as “metaphysical theorization”, on the grounds of “metaphysical premise”, essential penetration of praxis and cultural animation.

So far we have insisted mainly on their ontologico-metaphysical import. But this is not their “proper” metaphysical value, because it is the element “common” to every ideology as rationalized praxis. It is rationalized praxis that by nature bears an ontologico-metaphysical import that is universal, absolute, totalizing (which is not, however, synonymous with “totalitarian”). That which instead “characterizes” each ideology not only as rationalized praxis but as “theorized”, is its “metaphysical theorization” of praxis, as “metaphysical premise” from which to begin, as essential “penetration” of praxis itself, and as “cultural animation”.

In order to grasp therefore the “proper” metaphysical value of capitalism and Marxism, we need to also, and above all, work out an account of their “metaphysical theorization” in the three aspects listed – as specific metaphysical premise, as essential penetration of praxis itself, and as cultural animation.

8. Capitalism and Marxism as metaphysical theorization

Capitalism and Marxism as ideologies are “rationalized praxis”, with the metaphysical import inherent to praxis as such. But in order to “function”, they need to be also “metaphysically theorized praxis”, in harmony or in contrast with the authentic ontologico-metaphysical essence of praxis itself as ontico-dynamic historical reality.

It is precisely this “metaphysical theorization of praxis” that characterizes and transforms them into “ideologies in the strict sense”, as “rationalized and theorized praxis”, constructive of the new society and of history. But we must keep in mind: their metaphysical theorization does not consist in the “elaboration of a new philosophical system” that would take its place along with other systems, thus enriching the history of philosophy. It consists instead in defining the “objective internal rationality” of praxis, moving it in the given direction: “capitalist, Marxist” or (to allude also to the third hypothesis of the Christian ideology) “authentically realist”. There results thus a metaphysical theorization “immanent” to praxis (because it defines its internal rationality) and not

17 limited merely to the minds of philosophers. A metaphysical theorization that “incarnates itself” in praxis, and becomes praxis, assuming such an importance as to “substitute religion” in its old role as foundation and soul of society.

Today in fact the “soul” and “foundation” of the new dynamic secular society and of the praxis that constructs it “is no longer religion” (and not even religious or personalist ethics), but the “metaphysical theorization immanent” to praxis and the very rationalized and theorized praxis itself: it is “ideology” as rationalized and theorized praxis.

Something quite different from mere “philosophy”, just as “concrete reality” is different from the thought that thinks it.

Hence the uselessness of a purely philosophical refutation of ideology as rationalized and theorized praxis. Ideology is in fact not a philosophy or a doctrine to be cerebrally refuted or convalidated, but a “praxis” to be resisted or convalidated operatively. This explains why the continuous refutations and condemnations of capitalism and Marxism have not even scratched their surface, and how the river of truth that has been poured onto the world has remained a river of sterile words, without generating a rationalized and theorized praxis at the service of truth itself. The truth has remained extraneous to the internal rationality of praxis, while the “metaphysical theorization” of capitalism and Marxism has become the “effective reality” of such rationality, defined either in a capitalist or in a Marxist manner. It has become their objective ontologicometaphysical

constant (even if false), while the “thought that thinks it” turns out to be the subjective fact of particular capitalist or Marxist theorists.

What happened in the case of Christianity has been repeated for capitalism (liberalism) and Marxism (communism). Christianity as authentic objective revealed reality remains one and the same while its “theologians” are many, and it cannot be taken for granted that they find themselves in agreement even when they are orthodox. It is the same for capitalism and Marxism as rationalized and theorized praxis. Each remains one and the same, while their theorists (called, with

some irony, the “theologians” of Marxism and capitalism) are many, with discordant doctrines. The important thing therefore is not to run behind these “theologians”, but to work out an account of the “basic metaphysical sense” that represents the constant of capitalism and Marxism, as the metaphysical definition of the “internal rationality” of their praxis.

9. Metaphysical definition of internal rationality

Such a metaphysical definition of the rationality internal to praxis, whether capitalist or Marxist, falls under three headings:

- 1) – It is a “dynamic” metaphysical definition of the rationality of praxis and therefore of praxis itself, with the typical and antirealist substitution of “being” with “becoming”. Apart from an authentic metaphysical realism, the substitution becomes inevitable, because the new historical reality born of the Industrial Revolution is “dynamic” and therefore penetrable only by means of a “dynamic metaphysics” (whether realist or antirealist).
- 2) – It is an “immanentist” dynamic metaphysical definition in the sense of the “negation of transcendence”, whether ontological or religious. The negation of transcendence in “absolute immanence” is not in fact a necessary characteristic of historical reality become dynamic. The very opposite is true! But if the “only dynamic metaphysical instrument” available is immanentist, the dynamic metaphysical definition of the rationality internal to praxis cannot but be “immanentist”.
- 3) – It is an “atheist-materialist” immanentist dynamic metaphysical definition of the rationality internal to praxis. But this third heading is merely the inevitable corollary of the first two.

Rationalized and theorized praxis is in fact but the “consummation” of their logic.

In effect: “capitalist” and “Marxist” praxis is first of all “dynamic”, “dynamic” historical reality. But it is “immanentist” dynamic historical reality, and therefore finds its ultimate explanation in itself, outside of God, who is ignored and excluded, substituted by capitalist and Marxist “praxis” itself, which contains within itself its own “ideological Absolute”, substitutive of God and of religion, translating into an “atheist ideological Absolute”.

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Capitalism and Marxism, therefore, because they are “immanentist dynamic praxis”, are constitutionally and incurably atheist: and this “ideological atheism” is much worse than philosophical and religious atheism. The latter is merely “negative” atheism, the atheism of the one who “does not believe”. “Ideological atheism”, on the other hand, is “positive”: the absence of God is filled by the “fullness” of the “Antidivine” that finishes by invading everything; it is “constructive” (C. Fabro), because it forms part of the “soul” of the praxis building the new dynamic secular society; it is “militant” because it mobilizes in the service of an atheist construction (atheist humanism, atheist society, atheist culture, amoral-atheist customs); it is an atheism “of the masses” (no longer individual, but of the class, party, of entire institutions and structures).

This is the atheism of capitalism and Marxism as rationalized praxis. Atheism, therefore, of dynamic historical reality itself, that in virtue of the dynamic immanentist metaphysics incarnated in capitalism and Marxism, has been transformed from a static-sacral into a dynamic historical reality that is “atheist” and... “materialist”.

Materialism is but the “final and fatal outcome” of a historico-dynamic secular reality that is immanentist and atheist. Because it is “secular” and “immanentist”, it cannot but “divinize” matter as the one supreme value, as the new “ideological Absolute”, substituting the old religious Absolute.

And it is precisely this new “atheist and materialist ideological Absolute” that substitutes religion as the foundation and soul of society, cementing itself, by means of the constructive praxis of the new dynamic secular society, in the constitution of society itself, by which “capitalist society” and “Marxist society” become synonyms of societies that are “constitutionally atheistmaterialist”.

Only the manner changes. “Atheist materialism” remains the common basis of capitalism and Marxism.

The difference turns out to be first of all “metaphysical”. The “atheist-materialist ideological Absolute” of “capitalism” is “centred” metaphysically in an “evolutionist individualist naturalism” that expresses itself politically in a regime of liberty and democracy. The “atheist-materialist” ideological Absolute of Marxism is “centred” metaphysically in a “collectivist historico-dialectical

V. THE IDEOLOGICAL OUTCOME OF REALIST-DYNAMIC METAPHYSICS

1. Metaphysics, historical reality, and the socio-political problem

Realist-dynamic metaphysics is the metaphysics of historical reality. Historical reality refers to the concrete existence of man and is to be clearly distinguished (without separating it, however) from cosmic, physical, natural reality. For a realist philosophy, such a distinction assumes a fundamental importance, because cosmic and natural reality is metaphysically “static”, a reality whose real essence already is; while historical reality is metaphysically “dynamic”, a reality whose real essence is not yet, but builds itself, becomes, constitutes itself actively in space and time. Metaphysics has thus two moments: “static” realist metaphysics (Aristotle, St Thomas), and “dynamic” realist metaphysics, the problem of which coincides with the fundamental problem of modern realist philosophy which has to transform itself into an integral realist philosophy, elaborating also, in point of fact, a realist-dynamic metaphysics. Realist-dynamic metaphysics is, therefore, nothing but the metaphysics of historical reality as dynamic reality. Historical reality in its turn implies another fundamental distinction, which is that between “religious-Christian” historical reality and “human-profane”, lay secular historical reality.

Metaphysically (and therefore in its deepest essence), Christian religious historical reality has always been “dynamic”, because it coincides with the “Mystical Body” which embraces (even though in different ways) all human beings (from Adam to the Universal Judgment), and which “constitutes itself” (St Paul) continuously in space and time, whether in itself or in its members as person-cells. But since dynamic reality and dynamic being presuppose static reality and static being, theology also articulates itself in “static” and “dynamic” phases, and ought to be elaborated in these two senses. This has happened abundantly for “static” theology, but has still to happen for “dynamic” theology, since the methodological instrument of realist-dynamic metaphysics was missing.

Human-profane historical reality, instead, began to be dynamic in an ontologico-metaphysical sense from the time humanity became capable of constituting it. “Ontologically dynamic” reality is the reality that is actively constituted in space and time by God or by man, or by both together. Now, man became capable (more exactly: “condemned himself”) of constructing profane historical reality as dynamic reality at the time of the Industrial Revolution. Because of this, profane dynamic historical reality as actual (and not merely potential) dynamic reality begins with the “Industrial Revolution”: it presents itself as a theoretical “ontologico-metaphysical problem” and as a massive “practical historical problem” precisely from time of the Industrial Revolution.

We must therefore pay attention to this profane dynamic historical reality, whether as one of the great metaphysical problems of today, or as the great practical problem for humanity in the new dynamic historical epoch. As “the greatest theoretical problem”, the new dynamic historical reality raises at the highest level the problem of its metaphysics, which “realistically” gives rise to “realistdynamic

metaphysics”, whose definitive outcome is “the dynamic organism with ontological value” or “dynontorganism”, and the human person historicized as its “person-cell”.

As “the greatest practical problem”, instead, the new profane dynamic historical reality raises the problem of its “constitution”, and obviously of its proper constitution, more so as “ontodynamic”

(and not simply “ethical”) constitution. The practical problem of the “ontico-dynamic constitution” of profane historical reality comes to be identified with the problem of “global sociopolitical

constitution” at all levels, from the neighbourhood to the international and world community. And such a socio-political problem, in its turn, comes to be identified with the “ideological” problem understood precisely as the problem of praxis constitutive of the new dynamic socio-political reality. Hence the importance of understanding “praxis” in order to understand the “ideological” outcome of realist-dynamic metaphysics.

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2. Dynamic historical reality as dynontorganism and as praxis

As we have said, in virtue of the definitive outcome of realist-dynamic metaphysics, profane dynamic historical reality is to be interpreted realistically as a single dynontorganism, articulating itself in innumerable subaltern dynontorganisms (from the world community to the states, regions,

metaphysics and its dynontorganic theologico-ecclesiological outcome. This is true both as a premise and as a historico-cultural human condition.

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materialism”, which is at the head of the messianic class of the proletariat and which expresses itself politically in dictatorship and anti-democracy.

10. Metaphysics in capitalism and Marxism

Even if at first sight metaphysics as the supreme expression of philosophy might appear completely extraneous to capitalism and Marxism (or at least “separable” from them), in fact it is just the contrary.

Capitalism and Marxism are present and operative in history, building for over a century the new dynamic secular society and the new historical reality, in virtue of a “metaphysics that is dynamic and immanent” to them, and “immanentist”, one that defines the “internal rationality” of praxis, translating capitalism and Marxism into authentic “ideologies” as “rationalized and theorized praxis”. It is such a metaphysics that translates ontologico-dynamic rationality into praxis, into “theorized rationality”, with the consequent possibility of mobilization and finalization of praxis itself which thus becomes “constructive praxis”.

In order to understand “capitalism” and “Marxism” in depth, therefore, we must first be able to grasp them as “ideologies” in the sense of rationalized praxis, and not reduce them superficially to an economic-social fact (capitalism) or a social-political one (Marxism). Such an erroneous reduction is rendered possible by ignorance of the new dynamic historical reality as “praxis” produced by the Industrial Revolution, of which capitalism and Marxism have become the opposing and exclusive expressions, especially as “atheist-materialist ideologies and ideological praxis”.

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This is the experimental reconfirmation, even though through a negative fact, of their “metaphysical value” as the “ontologico-metaphysical import” of praxis and as “metaphysical theorization” of its internal rationality. A metaphysical theorization that presents itself in its triple function of “metaphysical premise” of the whole theorization of praxis, “essential definition” of the rationality internal to praxis, and “cultural animation” of the “culture-knowledge” that places itself at the service of praxis itself.

The “metaphysical premise”, whether of capitalism or of Marxism as rationalized and theorized praxis, is “illuminist-immanentist”, potentially atheist-materialist from its very beginning, and reaching consummation in this sense with its transformation into “dynamic metaphysical” dialectic (Hegel) and “evolutionist dynamic metaphysics” (positivist and materialist evolutionism).

The “essential metaphysical definition” of the internal rationality of praxis marks the “difference” between capitalism and Marxism, articulating them into two opposing ideologies on the economic-politico-social plane (but not on the basic ethical, antireligious and metaphysical one!). They are differentiated by two metaphysical positions already mentioned: evolutionist individualist naturalism (capitalism) and collectivist historico-dialectical materialism (Marxism).

The function of “cultural animation” emanating from the metaphysical theorization of the internal rationality of praxis on the part of both capitalism and Marxism is the most spectacular and decisive fact, something that has never been seen in history. The whole of “culture-knowledge” is animated by the above mentioned “metaphysical theorization” in function of praxis. And this is necessarily so, because culture-knowledge is the self-consciousness of ideological praxis and the indispensable condition of its possibility and operative impact. “Ideology as rationalized praxis travels along the highway of culture” - in all its expressions: philosophy, science, technology, history, anthropological disciplines, literature, art, means of social communication, beginning from the “dynamic metaphysics” immanent to it.

This then is the nature of capitalism and Marxism as rationalized and theorized praxis: an “ontologico-dynamic synthesis of theory and praxis” that consolidates itself above and beyond the human being, who is overwhelmed by it up to the point of impotence. This also is a consequence of the “ontological passage from the static to the dynamic”: finding ourselves before and within an ontologico-dynamic historical reality that is stronger than us, whether as rationalized praxis or as “theorization” of its “internal rationality”, a theorization that takes on an “objective ontological univocity” that is undermined not even by the “heresies” but is, instead, served by them.

This is the reason why, when speaking of capitalism and Marxism from the metaphysical point of view, we have been silent about the old and new theorists (or “theologians”) that pertain to them (but who must not be ignored, so as to understand their seriousness). What matters is capitalism and

Marxism as “rationalized and theorized praxis”, beginning from the dynamic metaphysics that is immanent to them with its triple function; with the respective theorists, including Marx. To stop at their theorists would mean not having understood the nature of capitalism and Marxism. Above all it would mean not preparing oneself to help in the emergence of a “different dynamic historical reality”, a “different rationalized and theorized praxis”, that, in the profane field, remains the one possible salvation of a society and a world that have become dynamic.

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perfection of a realist and scientifically valid theological system.

11. The theoretical and practical value of dynontorganic theology and ecclesiology

Faith and eternal salvation, though conditioned by theological science, do not depend on it, in contrast to technological progress which depends directly on scientific progress. It is a question of two different types of causality. The causality of faith and salvation belong to the order of grace. It is “divine causality” working in the inner mystery of each individual soul; and therefore theological science as such remains substantially extraneous to it. Because the causality of theological science belongs to the human order, it remains “human causality”, despite being destined to be linked in some way to Divine causality and to cooperate with it.

But in itself theological science is and remains a cultural fact, with an essentially cultural, historical and social function. Science is always a historico-cultural response to a need of society. Science, including theological science, has a “social function”, rather than an individual one; and because it has a social function, it has also a cultural, historical function. In the case of theological

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science, it is a question of the Church, which is also (though not primarily) a “society”, with its social needs, and first among these the need for a “theological science”.

Hence the value of theological science in general, and especially of “dynontoganic” theological science. We say theological “science” and not theological “literature”, because, in the order of human knowledge (and theology as science is “human knowledge” of God and of divine things, although in the light of faith), the primary need of the Church is theological science and not a theology reduced to literature or worse, fallen to the level of a commercial consumer good; and, what more, a “realist” theological science that is up to the level of its “object”. This science, coinciding with revealed Christian reality which is “static and dynamic” at the same time, implies an integral realist theology, static as well as dynamic.

Static realist theology prepares the way for and is crowned by dynamic realist theology. And it is precisely realist-dynamic theology that is directly of interest to us here. Since, further, “dynamic historical reality” (whether religious or profane) is by nature “dynontorganic”, its adequate theorization cannot but be “dynontorganic”, postulating a dynontorganic realist theology.

This is the theological demand of today, of the postconciliar period whose supreme scientifictheological

need is precisely that of a dynontorganic ecclesiology; in other words, a theology of the Church that “is truly adequate to the being of the Church itself, consisting of the mysterious divinehuman

dynontorganic being of the Mystical Body”.

In its turn, this “dynontorganic ecclesiology” corresponds to the teaching of Vatican II beginning with *Lumen Gentium*, which as a document of the Supreme Magisterium should not be understood as a text of ecclesiology, but as the postulation of an ecclesiological science that really corresponds to “the real and total being of the Church”, which is the case with dynontorganic ecclesiology.

The theoretical value of dynontorganic ecclesiology depends on this correspondence. And its practical value depends on the fact that dynontorganic theological science (of which dynontorganic ecclesiology is the synthetic key) is at once both theoretical and practical, doctrinal and pastoral at the highest level. The “dynontorganism” of the Mystical Body, in fact, which embraces the whole of revealed reality, is at once “being” and “praxis”, and its realist theological study is at once study of its “being” and of the “praxis” emanating from it, assuming a value that is theoretico-practical, dogmatico-pastoral, truly fundamental and decisive.

Let us prescind here from the dynontorganic developments of the whole of theology and of the disciplines into which it is articulated or which are subalternate to it. Let us prescind also from the practical consequences that follow from it. If we keep in mind the aphorism, “*Qualis Ecclesiologia, talis Theologia et total vita Christiana*”, we will have an idea of the role of dynontorganic ecclesiology in relation to the whole Christian system, theological and cultural, religious and pastoral.

We may therefore conclude keeping in mind this aphorism, and taking note of the fact that the substantial “dynontorganic renewal”, which presents itself as necessary for the Church of today and even more so for the Church of tomorrow, becomes concretely possible with realist-dynamic

Historically, it is not possible to ignore realist philosophy and theology, even if “static”. But it is one thing to accord them a historical interest, and another to continue understanding and reaffirming them in a valid and vital way. The dynamic, as we have already said, bases itself on the static and builds itself making use of the static. The first thing to be done in this post-conciliar period, therefore, was that of wisely reevaluating “static” realist philosophy and theology, in order to be able to build on them a realist-dynamic philosophy and theology. This becomes concretely possible with realist-dynamic metaphysics.

10. The dynontorganic theological outcome

Precisely because the “dynamic” postulates the “static”, realist-dynamic metaphysics recovers and reevaluates vitally (and critically) static realist philosophy and theology, beginning with St Thomas (and that is why it is called “Thomist”), and opens the door to a new culture in which any problem whatsoever (whether “static” or “dynamic”) finds its proper collocation and opens itself to a proper theoretical and practical solution.

This is the prerogative of “integral realism”: the ability to adequate to the “totality of the real” and to open itself to the “whole truth” beginning from the highest levels, metaphysical, and theologico-dogmatic. This does not mean exhausting truth or reality, but rather grasping each in their total context, and in the measure that is historically necessary for living with honesty and wisdom.

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This and none other is in fact the cognitive capacity of the human race, by means of reason and Revelation, whatever be its abuses, deviations or culpable insufficiencies. In this perspective realist-dynamic metaphysics presents itself as the key to “integral realism”. This realism, in order to be “integral”, must arrive at a realist-dynamic metaphysics. But in order to arrive at this, it must begin from realist metaphysics, not however conceived as self-sufficient and closed in itself, and not even as a logical premise from which to deduce consequences, but rather as the realist foundation on which to construct a realist dynamic metaphysics. And it will be by starting from realist-dynamic metaphysics that it will arrive, as a necessary outcome, at a “dynontorganic” theology and ecclesiology.

Let us see briefly just “how”. “Dynontorganic” theology and ecclesiology consists in the encounter between realist-dynamic metaphysics and Christianity rediscovered and re-postulated as “dynamic reality” under the impulse of a clear dynamic cultural historical demand. The course of history collides against political, economic, social, and even “religious” reality, giving off sparks that are also signs of alarm and making new demands and new responses, which from the point of view of science (philosophy, theology, or “sciences of the phenomenon”) are always demands for a “new science” or a new development of science.

This has happened and is happening also in the case of theology and ecclesiology. For more than a century there have been arising sparks of alarm that signal the insufficiency of a purely static theology and ecclesiology, and the historical demand for a profound renewal of these is becoming ever stronger. But it was only with Vatican II that the question exploded, with results that were not really very satisfying. The metaphysical instrument for responding to the historical demand, which was a demand for a “dynamic renewal”, was lacking. More precisely, a realist-dynamic metaphysics was lacking. But its mere presence will be enough to guarantee, with the mediation of the actual dynamic historical demand and with the “rediscovery” of Christianity as dynamic reality, the “dynontorganic theological ecclesiological outcome” of realist-dynamic metaphysics.

As we have already had occasion to repeat, it is philosophy, and especially metaphysics, that conditions the science of theology, up to the point of opening up the way for a new dynamic development, or pushing it along this road almost by force. It is enough that realist-dynamic metaphysics be adopted as the “methodo-logical instrument” of theological science, as in the past static metaphysics had been adopted.

But when will this happen? We are not interested in the “when”. We are interested in the historico-cultural mechanism that will lead to the above mentioned outcome, in spite of its rejection by the theologians of today. Theologians pass, but the science of theology remains, with its endogenous drive towards completeness, towards the recovery of its authentic realism, towards the conquest of the whole of Christian truth, towards an ever more adequate response to the historical demand. It is the guarantee of the advent of a realist-dynamic theology and ecclesiology as the

III. REALIST-DYNAMIC METAPHYSICS

1. A “philosophical revolution”?

At first sight it might seem a bit strange to speak of a “revolution”, even if purely “philosophical”, as far as metaphysics is concerned. And it is even stranger to speak of a revolution as far as realist-dynamic metaphysics is concerned, given that it has nothing to do with violent historical revolutions in the classical sense of the word.

Historically, “revolution” signifies a radical and rapid change of structures through violent means. A typical case is the French Revolution, which marked the passage from the old feudal society to the bourgeois society, and the so-called “October Revolution”, which marked the passage from Tsarist Russia to Soviet Russia.

Concretely, such revolutions are connected with a philosophy: the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which prepared the way for the French Revolution; and the Marxist philosophy, which animated the Russian Revolution. But the respective revolutions present themselves as historico-political facts, not as philosophical revolutions, even if the historico-political revolution itself was preceded and followed by a “cultural revolution” in the sense of a change of civilization more or less rapid and radical, to which philosophy is never extraneous.

We instead speak of a “philosophical revolution” with reference to a very precise “metaphysics” which is “realist-dynamic” in character. Today “pluralism” has become fashionable in all fields, including those of philosophy and theology. It is considered a progress, but it could also be a fearful regress. It is above all a negation of the authentic possibility of a “philosophical revolution” in the best sense of the word, of which there is perhaps an extreme need. It is the impossibility of a “philosophical conversion” that could at least potentially lead to a “philosophical revolution”. An authentic “philosophical revolution” implies a profound intellectual conversion that marks a radical change in the course of philosophizing, so as to mark a new way for philosophy. If this happens not merely to individuals but in a more general way, in the measure that it translates into a generalized fact it becomes a philosophical revolution, linked of course to a cultural revolution, which in its turn can be connected to different realities (such as religion and politics) and involve the whole of historical reality, ending up even in a change of civilization.

This is precisely because a “philosophical revolution” by its nature is neither violent nor transient, but tends to consolidate itself and perpetuate itself in time, giving rise to a kind of “permanent and non-violent revolution”. Such is the revolutionary significance of “realist-dynamic metaphysics”: “permanent non-violent philosophical revolution”, on its own merit as a simple philosophical revolution; and as “historico-cultural”, a “realist-dynamic metaphysics” destined to integrate itself with the three great permanent revolutions: the “Christian revolution”, the “Industrial Revolution” and the “ideological revolution”.

2. Realist-dynamic metaphysics and the three “permanent revolutions”

The three permanent revolutions indicated above, with which realist-dynamic metaphysics must integrate itself, even though completely heterogeneous, converge on the basis of the following elements: they are “permanent” and not transient; they are “dynamic” in so far as they are expressions of a dynamic historical reality; they postulate a cultural key, a “dynamic metaphysics”.

1) They are “*permanent*” and (we must add) *non-violent*. This is at least the nature of “permanent revolution”: “non-violence”. If this nature is betrayed, there can occur violent aspects or episodes of violence, which indicate such a betrayal.

Because they are “non-violent”, the three revolutions are clearly distinguished from the “violent revolution”, which, precisely because “violent”, cannot last, cannot be permanent, even if its marks remain. The reason for the difference lies in this: the permanent revolution is an authentic dynamic revolution (and therefore constructive), while violent revolution, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, is still a “static revolution”. It believes that it can justify itself on the pretext that historical reality is static, “stationary”, because of which, if one wants to change it or make it

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“move”, a violent revolution is necessary. In the context of a “dynamic historical reality” that is in continuous change and transformation, the violent revolution ends up in fact as an “historical absurdity”.

2) The three permanent revolutions, besides being permanent and non-violent, are also “dynamic” by nature because they are expressions of a dynamic historical reality, they are identical

with dynamic historical reality, they change, transform, and dynamically construct historical reality.

a) – This is true of the *Christian revolution* as “permanent religious revolution”, because the “Christian religious reality” (“Christianity”) is dynamic in its innermost nature (it is enough to think of the Mystical Body that “constitutes itself”). Its function is precisely that of changing, transforming, constructing “spiritually” a new world (the “new creation”), and is therefore a “revolutionary function” *par excellence* in the sense of a permanent non-violent revolution.

b) – Though it belongs not to the religious and spiritual realm but to the material and economic realm, even the “*Industrial Revolution*” is a dynamic revolution. It is enough to think of the changes and transformations, the constructive impulses injected by it into the whole of historical reality, bringing about the passage from the old static historical reality to the new dynamic historical reality. And it is also a permanent revolution, and because permanent, it should be also non-violent. The violence that has accompanied it and still does, is not the fruit of its nature but of a perversion of its nature.

c) – As for the third permanent *revolution*, the *ideological* one, nothing is more obvious than the fact that it is also “dynamic”. It is enough to keep in mind the true reality of “ideology” as “rationalized praxis constructive of the new dynamic society”, and the precise meaning of “dynamic”. A dynamic society is one that “is not yet but is in construction”, that constructs itself continually, “actively”, in space and time, in function of a given “rationalized praxis”. It is, however, a “revolutionary praxis”, because it changes, transforms, builds society continuously. But it is revolutionary praxis in the sense of “permanent non-violent” revolution, precisely because it is dynamic. If violence is present, it is because the whole of “dynamic historical reality” is badly served, remains misunderstood, or even knowingly and willfully betrayed.

3) The three permanent revolutions (the Christian, the industrial and the ideological) postulate a “dynamic metaphysics” as their “cultural key”. This is their most important aspect, and it is that confers on dynamic metaphysics its most intense revolutionary meaning, as if to say: there is no “permanent revolution” without “dynamic metaphysics”; and there is no dynamic metaphysics without permanent revolution.

We will try to explain ourselves, especially in reference to realist-dynamic metaphysics, to clarify the profound significance of “philosophical revolution”, not merely in itself, but also as the cultural key to the three permanent revolutions.

3. The revolutionary significance of realist-dynamic metaphysics

The history of philosophy shows that a philosophical doctrine can sometimes itself be a revolutionary fact, or else the object of a philosophical revolution. Since the Fathers of the Church, but especially since St Thomas Aquinas, Christianity has revolutionized philosophy making it, as the medieval theologians used to say, “*ancilla theologiae*”. In this case it was the Christian religion with its transforming force that made philosophy the object of its revolution, making it the key to a cultural revolution, which was the Christian one. With Kant, philosophy is no longer the object of a revolution, but itself becomes a “philosophical revolution”. Kant himself calls his philosophy a “Copernican revolution” in philosophizing, and he was right. Before him philosophy was centered on the “object”; with him it begins centering on the “subject”, and even today we have not yet liberated ourselves from the “slavery to the subject”.

But the philosophy of Kant was “static”, because of which his philosophical revolution was destined to remain a prisoner of itself. With Hegel we have the first “great dynamic metaphysics”,
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destined not only to be itself a revolution, but also to become the “cultural key” to that “permanent ideological revolution” that goes by the name of “Marxism”.

It is Marx in fact who turned the dynamic Hegelian metaphysics into the cultural key of Marxism, transforming it from a simple and more or less innocuous philosophical revolution into an ideological one. This is so true that it would not be wrong to say that, without Hegel, Marx would have halted at a utopian and romantic “para-ideological” socialism rather than passing to “scientific socialism”, to a proper “ideological socialism” in the sense of praxis rationalized and mobilized towards the construction of a socialist society.

Perhaps we can only now measure the “revolutionary force” of these “dynamic metaphysics”, because only today, in the light of experience, is it possible to have an idea of the upheavals caused

Just as, in fact, dynamic being requires static being, on which it rests and from which it grows, so also static being demands fulfillment in dynamic being: in the Christian historical reality “born dynamic”; and in profane historical reality “become dynamic” with the Industrial Revolution. Given that realist philosophy has been transformed from merely “static” realist philosophy into “integral” realist philosophy, or a realist philosophical system that is “complete” (structurally, and never in its elaboration) in the sense that it is equipped with a static and dynamic realist metaphysics, let us examine the theologico-ecclesiological outcome of the latter.

9. “Static” and “dynamic” theology

“Theological science”, as we have already had opportunity to mention, is very much conditioned by its philosophical methodological instrument, above all at the metaphysical level, at the level, that is, of “metaphysics” as a component of theological method on the one hand, and on the other at the level of “dogmatic theology”, which corresponds in some way to a “metaphysics of revealed reality”, a “metaphysics of the Supernatural”.

The “conditioning” of “theological science” begins already with the “choice of philosophy”, which means the “choice” of its “philosophical instrument”, or of the philosophical component of its theological method. This choice has a decisive importance for theological science, because it will be what its philosophical instrument allows it to be.

If therefore theological science wants to be realist and objectively valid, it should select a philosophical (and above all “metaphysical”) instrument that is realist and objectively valid. This was the reason why, historically, theological science ended by adopting realist philosophy as its philosophical instrument. And this was a question of an epistemological clarification of the first order. The merit is above all that of St Thomas who remains the “realist theologian” (and
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“realist philosopher” before that) *par excellence*, not only by reason of method but also of his teaching.

Once the problem of method was resolved in principle with the selection of a realist philosophy for a realist theology, the second condition came up, expressed in the question: was the realist philosophy adopted as the methodological instrument complete or incomplete from the metaphysical point of view?

Unfortunately it was an incomplete methodological instrument, because realist philosophy, in its theoretical elaboration, had stopped at a static metaphysics, and was a merely “static” realist philosophy, completely bereft of a dynamic realist metaphysics.

Hence the already mentioned “second conditioning” of theology, something that remained unchanged for too many centuries: the incompleteness of realist philosophy which, inevitably, had a negative consequence, forcing realist theology itself to remain a merely “static realist theology”, without even the possibility of transforming itself into a “dynamic” realist theology. For such a transformation it was necessary to transform the philosophical instrument, developing a
realistdynamic

metaphysics. In the absence of this, the methodological hurdle was (and remained in fact) insuperable.

There was thus a double incompleteness: the incompleteness of the methodological instrument, and that of theological science. This is still the situation today, though with different reactions. This double incompleteness was not felt by the medieval and Tridentine theologians as a lacuna. The “culture” of the time did not yet have a “dynamic” philosophical and theological exigence. It was, if at all, the “reality” of Christianity itself (reality that is “dynamic” by its very nature and from its very birth) that was the bearer of the “dynamic” exigence.

But while the dynamic historical reality of the Mystical Body, under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, has always functioned, despite all the historical and cultural hesitations, the hour of translating its dynamic exigence into a precise “cultural historical demand” struck only in the historical epoch that became dynamic thanks to the Industrial Revolution. There is no doubt that the “dynamic cultural historical demand” is today impelling and acutely felt, raising for theology the problem of the overcoming of its double “static” conditioning, methodological and doctrinal. But with what reactions? With what consequences? The first reaction was to throw away our philosophical and theological cultural patrimony precisely because it was “static”, giving it at most a historiographical attention.

Such is the integral realist philosophico-theological system. At this point we must ask whether such a system has ever been elaborated; and if not, why. Once again there crops up the problem of *“philosophia ancilla theologiae”*, that is, the question of the “realist philosophical methodological instrument” that makes a “realist theology” possible. If the realist philosophical instrument is missing, the corresponding realist theology becomes impossible.

This explains the lack of a “dynamic realist theology” (beginning with “realist-dynamic ecclesiology”): the “realist-dynamic metaphysical instrument” that would make it possible has been missing. We recall the analogy with the mathematical instrument: would a nuclear physics be possible on the basis merely of the four operations of arithmetic or the Pythagorean table?

Thus without the “realist-dynamic metaphysical instrument”, a realist-dynamic ecclesiology is not possible, even though the Church is the dynamic historical reality *par excellence*, to be studied and known “as such” by a theological-ecclesiological science adequate to its task.

But the problem becomes even worse: not only has the absence of a “realist-dynamic metaphysics” impeded the elaboration of a “realist-dynamic theology”, but it has also made it impossible for Catholic culture to have an in-depth knowledge of profane historical reality, precisely as a new historical reality that has become “dynamic”.

Here, however, we limit ourselves to the theological problem.

8. Theological system and dynamic being

The realist theological system, as we have said, consists of two components, static and dynamic. The two components, far from excluding each other, actually postulate each other and integrate themselves. The theologico-dynamic component requires the static, because “dynamic reality” (including Christian religious dynamic reality) is built on the foundation of static reality, making use of static or first degree being. A banal example and one that is easy to understand, even if in itself of merely technical value, is a “house under construction”. This is a “dynamic being”, and therefore of the second degree. It is built using bricks or other materials, which figure as beings of

34 the first degree, or as static beings; further, it must rest on a solid foundation, also itself a “being of the first degree”, “static” being, especially if one recalls the “house built on rock” of the Gospel. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the “house under construction” is a “new being”, a “new creation”, and not simply a “heap” (*acervus*) of things that are chaotic, or else ordered and coordinated, by which the house would be reduced to a “bundle of relations”. This strange and antirealist ‘emptying out’ of second degree being to first degree being would be like reducing the living man to his chemical components, because of the fact that his body is simply a mass of atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, carbon and a few other elements. A nullification which is not acceptable for man and for the human body (notwithstanding the *“memento homo quia pulvis es...”*), because no one, apart from the crass materialist, confuses man with his chemical analysis.

But this kind of operation occurs unfortunately in the philosophical area, insofar as so-called realist philosophers negate the existence of the dynamic being of the second degree because it is composed of static beings or beings of the first degree....

This is what has prevented “realist philosophy” up to now from completing itself with a “realistdynamic”

metaphysics, transforming itself into an “integral” realist philosophy, which it ought to be. This, even though in the concrete world in which we live, “static” being develops almost automatically into “dynamic” being in so far as “nature” which is metaphysically “static” develops into “history”; and “man”, who in his “nature” is also himself metaphysically a “static being”, is of interest above all as concretely existing “historicized” man, and therefore as a being of the second grade, “dynamic being”.

With greater reason this can be said of the “Church”, which as Mystical Body of Christ has been from the very beginning the “great dynamic historical reality” to be interpreted metaphysically and theologically as dynamic reality, dynamic being, and definitively as “dynontorganic reality”.

Therefore the superficial and more or less aprioristic rejection of “dynamic being” has unanticipated consequences. These can be summed up in terms of the impossibility of passing from a static realist metaphysics to a dynamic realist metaphysics, from a static realist theology to a dynamic realist theology, ignoring, among other things, the fact that static being and dynamic being postulate each other.

by them, whether in the area of culture or in relation to historical reality as a whole, which as dynamic historical reality called for an interpretative key that was dynamic and metaphysical. “Dynamic revolutionary metaphysics”, therefore, whether Hegelian dialectical metaphysics or evolutionist positivism. But both “immanentist” dynamic metaphysics, and therefore atheistmaterialist

(because this is the ultimate basis of the immanentism that negates transcendence: atheism and materialism). Thanks to this, they have triggered a “pluralist” atheist-materialist ideological revolution that is the great permanent revolution of modern times.

It is at this point that there arises the problem of a “realist-dynamic” metaphysics, or better, this metaphysics demands to be given a hearing – a metaphysics that is not immanentist but “transcendent”, and is the trigger of a revolution that is not atheist-materialist but “theo-spiritual”. Such a realist-dynamic metaphysics is clearly “revolutionary” in itself, and even more so in relation to the three permanent revolutions that are directly of interest to it – and to us: the permanent Christian revolution, the permanent Industrial Revolution, the permanent ideological revolution.

Let us see therefore the revolutionary significance of realist-dynamic metaphysics, first in itself, and then in relation to culture and to the three permanent revolutions in question.

4. Realist-dynamic metaphysics as itself a philosophical revolution

Let us begin by noting that when we characterize realist-dynamic metaphysics as a “philosophical revolution”, we are falling neither into clichés nor into conformistic language. It is enough to keep in mind that we refer to a permanent non-violent revolution that does not allow even verbal violence; much less can it be confused with a revolutionary fervour consisting of idle talk or of the conformism of anti-conformism. “The permanent non-violent revolution is something serious, and it is such beginning from the very philosophical revolution itself”.

A revolution is philosophical when it produces, or is destined to produce, a philosophical – and therefore also cultural – upheaval that is profound and lasting. This is even more the case when such a philosophical revolution is concentrated in a dynamic metaphysics, because such a metaphysics, besides being a “philosophical revolution” in itself and in reference to culture, becomes such also with respect to the whole of the dynamic historical reality that permeates it. It is in this sense that we characterize realist-dynamic metaphysics as a “philosophical revolution”, and so it is in fact.

It is a question, however, of seeing why it is so. There are two ways in which we can explain it: by examining its “metaphysical content”, and by highlighting its ability to “cause upheaval”. Restricting to a minimum the reference to its content, we will try to concentrate on its ability to cause upheaval.

The content of realist-dynamic metaphysics revolves around three points:

- The metaphysical category of “dynamic being”, without which realist-dynamic metaphysics remains impossible;

- The “ontologico-metaphysical interpretation” of dynamic historical reality as CUDB (“concrete universal dynamic being”) that makes possible the “ontological unification” of dynamic historical reality while conserving its infinite articulations; 23

- Its “dyn-ont-organic interpretation” that, with the discovery of dyn-ont-organism, reveals the deep “organic-dynamic ontological nature” of historical reality, offering the definitive key to its metaphysical comprehension and to its realist dyn-ont-organic construction.

It is inevitable that such references to the content of realist-dynamic metaphysics remain enigmatic and insufficient. They call for a deep study with the necessary didactical aids. For those who wish to do this as professional philosophers, or launch into a proper philosophical study, we refer to a trilogy on “dynamic realism”.² This is the first essay on realist-dynamic metaphysics, and will suffice for an initial introduction to it.

Even for those who simply want to take note of the philosophical problem, it is important to grasp the “revolutionary force” of realist-dynamic metaphysics in itself and in relation to Catholic and lay philosophical culture.

Realist-dynamic metaphysics places itself in the line of classical Aristotelian-Thomist

philosophy, not because it is a question of Aristotle and Thomas, but because their metaphysics is the best historical expression of realist philosophy and of the realist method of philosophizing as compared to methods of philosophizing that are not properly realist. But realist philosophy has remained fixed for centuries on the positions of Aristotle and St Thomas, and the Neo-Thomist and Neo-Scholastic philosophical movement has not succeeded in changing this situation. What is needed is a philosophical revolution that is not “antirealist” but “realist”, one that only a

realistdynamic metaphysics can bring about, that shifts the old realist metaphysical system from “statics” to “dynamics”, or more exactly from a “partial” realist metaphysical system to an “integral” realist metaphysical system – one that is “at once static and dynamic”.

Clearly, such a realist-dynamic metaphysics must be a real revolution in the philosophical field, just as the “shift from statics to dynamics” is something revolutionary in any field, beginning from that of metaphysics. It is from this that the great modern revolutions have begun. We have already seen this with respect to the dynamic metaphysics of the dialectical variety (Hegel and Marx) and the evolutionist variety (positivist and capitalist). On the basis not of experience (we have none as yet) but of projection, the same observation can be made with respect to realist-dynamic metaphysics. The passage from the old static realist metaphysical system to the new dynamic realist metaphysical system effected by dynamic realist metaphysics can be so revolutionary as to mark the beginning of a “new realist philosophical epoch” and of a “new culture”.

This is the revolutionary value of realist-dynamic metaphysics, whether in reference to Aristotelian-Thomist realist philosophy because of its capacity to renew and relaunch itself, or “antirealist” dynamic metaphysics, because of the fact that it “breaks their monopoly” on dynamic metaphysics.

It is a question of revolution and change that are not passively accepted but actively imposed. When we “undergo” change, even philosophical change, we are not causing a revolution but rather suffering one brought about by others. It is realist-dynamic metaphysics that puts the Catholic world in a position to impose change, first of all on itself and then on others, rather than suffering it; thus the spiral of changes “undergone” in all fields is broken. The revolutionary force today, in the sense of the permanent non-violent revolution, belongs to those who have at their disposal a realist and objectively valid dynamic metaphysics, rather than to those deprived of it. On the other hand it is simpler and easier to undergo change than to impose it, to suffer revolution rather than to cause it.

Catholic resistance to accepting realist-dynamic metaphysics – despite that fact that such a metaphysics belongs to it – is itself proof of its revolutionary significance. It is difficult to take the path of revolution, even when it is a question of a permanent revolution that is not violent and beneficent; such is the case of the realist-dynamic metaphysical revolution and of the cultural

2 Cf. Tommaso DEMARIA, *Realismo dinamico* (Collana SPID); Vol. I - *Ontologia realistico-dinamica*; Vol. II -

Metafisica della realtà storica; Vol. III - *La realtà storica come superorganismo dinamico*.

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revolution consequent upon it. It is easier to adjust to the cultural revolutions of others, even if this places us outside of history and amounts to a betrayal of our responsibilities.

But this also goes to show that realist-dynamic metaphysics is a “revolutionary reality”, too shocking not to be rejected almost instinctively, so that one can settle down into a tranquil “*quieta non movere*” or abandon oneself to some conformism that is all too often the negation of a necessary and obligatory “*age contra*”.

5. Realist-dynamic metaphysics and cultural revolution

A dynamic metaphysics is by its very nature a “cultural matrix”, and is therefore destined to produce a “cultural revolution” in the measure in which it is “revolutionary”. “Realist-dynamic” metaphysics, therefore, because it is already itself revolutionary, necessarily leads to a cultural revolution because as dynamic metaphysics it is a cultural matrix.

The Catholic world today obviously needs a “cultural revolution” in the best sense of the word, and the world in general too, not because it is bereft of “cultural revolutions” (there are in fact too many of them), but because it is troubled by a false and noxious culture rather than a sane and beneficial one. Here also we need to first clarify the terms “culture” and cultural revolution.

simply for the sake of completing the “system” of realist philosophy, but in order to meet a very precise historical demand.

6. The demand of history today

It is well known that artistic geniuses, even though always conditioned by their environment, can arise at any moment of history and be independent enough of it to draw out their work of art from their own creative capacity. Art is, in fact, “meta-historical”; it is not a “function of history”, and is quite independent from history. Science, instead, with its development and progress, is a “function of history”: it is always a response to a historical demand, to a historical necessity.

Chemistry is today a historical necessity (it was not at the time of St Thomas); it is because of this that it is studied and that it progresses. This is the case also with medicine.

This should have happened also in the case of realist philosophy. The integration of its static realist metaphysics with dynamic realist metaphysics should have happened already a hundred years ago, with the relaunching of Thomism and of Scholasticism carried out (or more exactly “attempted”) by Neo-Thomism and Neo-Scholasticism. But nothing really decisive took place. Because of this we find ourselves confronted with a “historical demand”, a “historical necessity” of a philosophico-metaphysical order which has still not been met or else has barely begun to be met, what with incomprehension and indifference (if not rejection) on the part of the very realist philosophers themselves.

Let us, however, prescind from this unjustifiable delay and take note of what follows. The “passage” from the old realist philosophy, equipped with only its “static” metaphysics, to an “integral realist” philosophy equipped with a realist metaphysics that is not merely “static” but also dynamic, even though only embryonically, has already been achieved or at least attempted. We have only to continue, leading the new static-dynamic realist philosophy to its natural outcomes. These are the two outcomes of realist-dynamic metaphysics, in “dynontorganic” theology and ecclesiology, and in ideology as “dynontorganic” praxis (and theory of praxis).

At this moment, we are directly interested only in the first outcome. We seek to grasp it, first analyzing “revealed reality”, and then “the dynontorganic theologico-ecclesiological outcome” of realist-dynamic metaphysics.

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7. “Static” and “dynamic” revealed reality

In terms of “realist” theology and ecclesiology, the object of theological science has to be “revealed reality”. Revealed reality is the “heart” of realist theology and ecclesiology. The rest is merely accompaniment.

“Revealed reality” (beginning with God himself who reveals) is “knowable” only through “divine Revelation”, which is manifested through the “history of salvation” beginning with Genesis and ending with the death of the last Apostle.

Going by the same divine Revelation, “revealed reality” is a double reality, “meta-historical” and “historical”. “Meta-historical” revealed reality is that which lies beyond history (e.g. God) and should not be confused with history even when it lies within it (e.g. the divine-human reality of Christ). “Historical” revealed reality instead is “historical reality” properly speaking (e.g. the “Church militant”, the Mystical Body of Christ on earth), and is historical reality *par excellence*. “Meta-historical reality” (non-revealed as well as revealed) is metaphysically “static” (it is already, in the immutability of its being or of its essence) giving rise to “static” philosophicometaphysical and theological study.

“Historical reality” is instead metaphysically “dynamic” (reality that constitutes itself in space and time through activities) and must be studied as “dynamic reality”, whether philosophically or theologically (if we are dealing with the revealed historico-dynamic reality that is the Church). Such study gives rise, respectively, to a “realist-dynamic metaphysics” with a “dynontorganic” outcome, and to an ecclesiology (or ecclesiological theology) already “dynontorganic” from the start.

Thus there emerges the outline of the following “epistemological picture”: a “static” and “dynamic” “realist metaphysics” in the area of philosophy; and a “static” and “dynamic” “realist theology” in the field of theology. All this, fully justified by the articulation of the reality which it studies: “static”, and “dynamic”; “non-revealed”, and “revealed”.

philosophy and theology is not an arbitrary hypothesis or idea, but “reality-truth”, which is one and equal for all, as, for that matter, is the case also for all the other sciences, with the exception of mathematics. Unless, that is, philosophy and theology renounce truth and their commitment as sciences in order to reduce themselves to personal speculations and to literature.

Not, therefore, the pluralism of free will and of error (the pluralism of truth is already pluralism of non-truth or of error), “but philosophical and theological realism that is objectively and scientifically valid”. Theological science has need of this kind of “philosophical realism”, and should resolve itself into this kind of “theological realism”, with the radical rejection of the pluralism of error and of arbitrariness, a pluralism that can be overcome only with the most tenacious fidelity to the objectivity of science (including philosophical and theological science) and to its realist method. And there will still be space for a sane philosophical and theological pluralism, as the flowering of truth and of unity, because the truth, which is “one”, is also an inexhaustible search, entailing the graduality of its conquest in time and admitting a plurality in expression.

If this is the case, there is good reason for the question that was posed: What philosophy at the service of theology? The choice of a philosophy ordered to a realist and objectively valid theological science is not arbitrary nor can it be imposed by the fashions of the day. It should be the choice of an “objective realist philosophy” and its corresponding “metaphysics” – unless one wishes to renounce “theology as science”, exchanging it for a certain type of religious literature. We should however examine the fate of realist philosophy in order to see that its realist-dynamic development and its “dynontorganic final outcome” represent neither the brilliance (or the illusion) of a single philosopher, nor an arbitrary philosophical choice at the service of theological science in competition with a multitude of others.

5. Realist philosophy: from static realist philosophy to integral realist philosophy

Realist philosophy, the greatest historical representatives of which were Aristotle and St Thomas, is “realist” by reason of “method” (the “objective realist” method of philosophizing) and “content” (metaphysical and philosophical truth, which corresponds in effect to the reality of things).

Like all the sciences, realist philosophy has been and continues to be a philosophy that was constructed little by little, by means of a gradual conquest that is never complete. This is the difference between science and a work of art. Science grows; a work of art remains the way it emerges from the mind or the hands of its author.

Science, then, precisely because it grows and progresses, is never finished. This means that historically it has had and continues to have its limitations. This is the case also with “realist

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philosophy”. A philosophy that remained limited even when elaborated by the greatest geniuses, like Aristotle and St Thomas. And what was the most painful limitation, the greatest lacuna of realist philosophy?

That this philosophy was – and remained – a realist philosophy with a “static” realist metaphysics, which was ignorant of “historical reality” as “dynamic ontological reality”. Neither Aristotle nor St Thomas thought of elaborating a “dynamic-realist metaphysics”, or a metaphysics of historical reality. In their times there did not exist a historical reality as “dynamic”, or at least this never became a problem. They may therefore be excused. Modern realist philosophers cannot instead be excused in this manner. Dynamic historical reality is in fact a completely modern phenomenon (imposing itself with the Industrial Revolution), and it created a completely new metaphysical problem, of which Aristotle and St Thomas were ignorant, and unfortunately, (inexcusably) also Neo-Thomists and in general the realist philosophers of our time.

The limitation, the lacuna of realist philosophy has therefore persisted, up to the point of rendering the old realist philosophy (including that of St Thomas) almost useless and leading to its abandonment. It should be clear instead that it should not have been and must not be abandoned but rather completed with a dynamic-realist metaphysics.

Thus there would have emerged a realist philosophy complete in its general structure (even if always incomplete in its elaboration). We would have arrived at an “integral” realist philosophy”, capable of embracing the whole of being (“static” as well as “dynamic”) in its two metaphysical moments, represented by “static realist metaphysics” and “dynamic realist metaphysics”: not

Culture, as we have already said, can be understood in three different though interconnected ways:

- as “culture-knowledge”;
- as “culture-values”;
- as culture-civilization”.

We are interested especially in culture-knowledge and the “cultural revolution” in the sense of culture-knowledge. Dynamic metaphysics is first of all “knowledge”, and therefore a knowledge matrix – like mathematics, which is a knowledge matrix of other infinite knowledges. But there is a radical difference between the two: mathematics is formal logical knowledge of quantity and number, and therefore ultimately of “matter”. Realist-dynamic metaphysics is instead ontological knowledge of historical reality and therefore of the “spirit” (not in the Hegelian sense), of the concretely existing human being, of the infinite realities that constitute human existence and transform it into existential human reality, into historical reality. Because of this, or better because “realist-dynamic metaphysics” is knowledge of historical reality at the highest level precisely because it is “metaphysics”, it is also “wisdom”, which is to say that it is “knowledge of values”, values that stand at the basis of civilization. Therefore the “cultural revolution” produced by “realist-dynamic metaphysics” in the sense of culture-knowledge leads to a cultural revolution in the sense of culture-values, and finally to a cultural revolution in the sense of “culture-civilization”. It is a chain of revolutions triggered by “dynamic metaphysics” (for us: “realist-dynamic” metaphysics), whose first link is and remains the “cultural revolution” in the sense of “cultureknowledge”,

which is directly connected to dynamic metaphysics. Dynamic metaphysics will therefore be the “direct matrix” of the cultural revolution in the sense of “culture-knowledge” (which connects directly with dynamic metaphysics) and the “indirect matrix” of the cultural revolution in the sense of culture-values and of “culture-civilization”.

This holds also for “realist-dynamic metaphysics”, which is also “matrix” of the “triple cultural revolution”, starting from the cultural revolution in the sense of culture-knowledge. This suffices to reaffirm and render ever more evident its “revolutionary force”.

But let us dwell on some points.

6. “Cultural mediation”

We Christians (not because of our merit, but because of the merit of Christianity) possess all the possible positive Christian and human values. It is because of this that in Catholic circles today we speak so much of “cultural mediation” and “cultural encounter”, in the sense of an offer of values on the part of the Church to the world, and of an encounter with Marxism that is not political but “cultural”, that is to say on the plane of values – without, unfortunately, paying attention to the fact

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that our values are already almost irrelevant, and are liquidated as soon as they enter into the ambit of “praxis”.

Today “values” are imposed from the standpoint of dynamic metaphysics,³ and mediated by the “triple cultural revolution” of which they are the matrix. Consequently, there is no cultural “mediation” today without cultural revolution. But no cultural revolution is possible without the “matrix” of the triple cultural revolution that consists in “dynamic metaphysics”, which for us ought to be “realist-dynamic” metaphysics. Outside this revolutionary context, it is a merely verbal exercise to speak of “cultural mediation” and “cultural encounter” in the sense of offer of values and encounter of values. Words are not enough, we need facts; not beautiful discourses but praxis and theory of praxis, starting from the highest “theory of praxis” that consists of dynamic metaphysics, a metaphysics that is not closed in on itself but that both involves and is involved in praxis at the same time. For us such a metaphysics consists in realist-dynamic metaphysics. This is the path of the triple cultural revolution that ensures the “cultural mediation” and makes possible the “cultural encounter”. It is, obviously, a complete “revolutionary system” that for us is a permanent non-violent revolution. Wanting to incarnate sane human and Christian values in a world that is poisoned spiritually and culturally even more than materially and ecologically, it is a revolutionary enterprise that for us becomes possible only on the basis of a “realist-dynamic metaphysical revolution”.

Let us prescind here from deepening and expanding the picture of the cultural revolution in the

sense of culture-knowledge, of which realist-dynamic metaphysics is the matrix and trigger. Let us pass on instead to the “relationship” between the “three permanent revolutions” (Christian, industrial, ideological) and realist-dynamic metaphysics.

7. Relationship between the permanent revolutions and realist-dynamic metaphysics

That the “Industrial Revolution” is an ongoing and even non-violent revolutionary fact (apart from human weaknesses which are infinite) that presents itself as a typical “permanent revolution”, is something we already take for granted. That the “ideological revolution” also identifies itself as a permanent revolution is also equally evident, provided we understand ideology as “rationalized praxis” transforming the world and constructing the new dynamic society.

Such transformation and construction, understood as continuous transformation and construction in the context of contemporary dynamic historical reality, resolves necessarily in an ongoing revolutionary process that translates the ideological revolution into a permanent revolution, beyond the initial violent revolutions that were radical and rapid changes of structures. Despite current equivocation and rhetoric, the real “ideological revolution” is not to be identified with violent revolution, even when it makes use of the latter as an initial technique, but is rather a permanent non-violent revolution. Much less can the ideological revolution be understood in the “pseudoideological”

sense of “deliberately violent revolution”, according to the mistaken schemes of the extreme Left.

There remains the “Christian revolution”, to be justified not so much as a non-violent revolution – that much can be taken for granted – but rather as an authentic permanent revolution. Christianity is by definition “permanent revolution”, because conversion is change and transformation of hearts and revolution is change and transformation of the world, beginning with the religious and spiritual change and transformation stemming from conversion.

We have said that at the root of all permanent revolutions (which are those that count) is a “dynamic metaphysical” revolution. From what we have just said about the Christian revolution, we must add that at the root of all sane and beneficial revolutions, there is, besides the realisdynamic

metaphysical revolution, also the “Christian revolution” as permanent spiritual and religious revolution. But there remains the problem of the “relationship” between the realisdynamic metaphysical revolution and the Christian revolution. To say that the former is a

[3 \[Translating the plural ‘metafisiche dinamiche’.\]](#)

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determining condition of the latter might sound like an unacceptable paradox. But this is a truth to which we must later return.

For now it is enough to keep in mind that in order to “change the world” and to ensure that Christianity might once again be the great spiritual and religious revolution, besides the work of the Spirit we need also “realist-dynamic metaphysics”. Only this can trigger that revolutionary process of mediations (beginning from cultural mediation) that Christianity needs in order to become once again an authentic Christian revolution.

But the relationship between permanent revolution and realist-dynamic metaphysics seems more and more problematic, even to the point of appearing to be non-existent in reference to the “Industrial Revolution”. What does a metaphysics, even a “dynamic” one, have to do with such a revolution? Metaphysics and Industrial Revolution seem to be antithetical terms, polar opposites.

And so they are, from many points of view. Metaphysics is work of the spirit. The Industrial Revolution is the most material operation or complex of operations that exists. Metaphysics is thought that transcends matter, while the Industrial Revolution is action immersed in matter. Metaphysics is understanding of reality; the Industrial Revolution is creation of economic and technological reality whose presupposition is not metaphysical but scientific-mathematical. And yet it is precisely here that dynamic metaphysics intervenes in decisive terms, with regard to the Industrial Revolution as economic and technological revolution, above and beyond its scientificmathematical

presuppositions.

8. Economics and dynamic metaphysics

In the context of the Industrial Revolution, the “economy” as economic science and economic

function without an adequate science, needs ‘theological science’, even if this is not the need of individual believers. It is one thing to speak of the ‘life of faith’ that depends not on theological science but on Grace; it is another to speak of the life of the Church that, because of unavoidable historical, cultural and operative exigences, cannot do without theological science. This becomes evident also in the case of civil society: no individual citizen is obliged to be a mathematician or a physicist in order to be a member of civil society or to enjoy its services. But civil society itself has need of mathematics, of physics, and of innumerable other sciences.

The Church also has need of theological science and of its multiple ramifications. By its nature, in fact, theological science is not a service to the individual, who can well be theologically illiterate and yet beloved of the Spirit; it is a ‘service to society’. It has a ‘social function’. It is a social rather than an individual function, even when the individual rejects it for himself and would like to see it rejected it also for society. Because of this, the individual can be satisfied even with a ‘literary’ theology; but the Church cannot. It requires a theology that is an authentic ‘theological science’. Hence the necessary service of philosophy to theology.

A many-sided service, but always clearly ‘instrumental’, precisely as a ‘methodologicoscientific-instrumental’ service that enables the transformation of theology into a proper ‘theological science’. Once again, it is just like the instrumental service of mathematics to the other sciences. The analogy between mathematics and philosophy remains, with implications that are ever new, if not unthinkable.

The complex service of philosophy to theology, especially at the metaphysical level, can be further clarified with the help of the same analogy. We can truly say that ‘mathematics’ is like a ‘metaphysics of matter’. But, on the other hand, we can and must also say that ‘metaphysics’ is like a ‘mathematics of the spirit’. Just as today it is impossible to have a science of matter without the help of the science of the ‘metaphysics of matter’ that is called mathematics, so also it is not possible to have a ‘theological science’ worthy of the name without the help of that ‘mathematics of the spirit’ that is called ‘metaphysics’.

Without the help of a well thought out metaphysics that is realist and objectively valid, theology finds itself exposed to every deviation, or else ends up by losing all scientific value, falling to the level of an ambiguous consumer cultural good.

If this is the case, today theology and even philosophy are faced with grave problems. These could be summed up in a single philosophico-theological problem: is there today an adequate and valid philosophical instrument at the service of theological science, just as there is a very valid mathematical instrument to serve every need of science and of technology? Let us see.

4. What philosophy at the service of theology?

Unfortunately, we have to admit that the philosophical instrument at the service of theology is today practically inexistent. In the past it was philosophy that rebelled against theology, proclaiming its own autonomy and even attempting to substitute theology. The outcome of this process has already been mentioned: “atheistic materialism” in the field of ideology and culture.

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Today it is theology that rebels against philosophy, simply rejecting it and believing that it can manage very well without it. The so-called “philosophical pluralism”, combined with “theological pluralism”, is but an aspect of this rejection, to which corresponds a “free” philosophizing and theologizing. There could be nothing better for liberating ourselves from the truth and from the Ten Commandments.

Someone will say: there is a good pluralism and a bad pluralism. Theoretically this is true. But, in practice, bad pluralism chases away good pluralism, just as bad money chases away good money. With this difference: that one introduces bad money into the market so as to be able to keep the good (“genuine”) money in one’s own pocket; while the “pluralists” of today are anxious to throw away good cultural money in order to accumulate bad cultural money.

One should not object that in the field of mathematics there are many geometries, all true, all good, enlarging enormously the field of mathematical science and its uses, and that this should be the case also with respect to philosophy and theology.

The difference is substantial, which is why the comparison does not make sense. The different geometries are the coherent and truthful scientific development of an initial logico-mathematical hypothesis, chosen freely and for determinate ends. Instead, the starting point and procedure for

different levels of philosophical and theological science in order to arrive at their “highest level”, that for philosophy is “metaphysics” and for theology is the so-called “dogmatic” or speculative theology.

“Metaphysics” is the highest level of philosophy because it studies “being in itself” (the whole of being), arriving at the Supreme Being that is God. “Dogmatic theology” is the highest level of theological science because it studies “God and the divine realities in themselves (and not as related to us), in the light of Revelation”.

The “relationship between philosophy and theology” arises especially at this highest level, between “metaphysics and “dogmatic theology”. That is why our topic is the “ecclesiological outcome of realist-dynamic metaphysics”. In other words, the topic situates the question of the relationship between philosophy and ecclesiology at the level of metaphysics and the (dogmatic) theology of the Church.

2. *Philosophia ancilla theologiae*

In what, then, does this relationship consist? It consists in a relationship of “service” of philosophy to theology. The medieval theologians expressed this service with the phrase “*Philosophia ancilla theologiae*” (philosophy is the handmaid of theology). Modern philosophy found this “service” displeasing, interpreting it as “bondage” and rebelling against it by proclaiming its independence from theology. This was the failure of “true” philosophy, beginning with the negation of itself as “philosophy of being” and ending in a miserable atheist-materialist philosophy. And this is the great new “wisdom” that philosophy and modern culture want to offer poor humanity!

How then can we be surprised about the predominance of atheist-materialist ideologies and about the disastrous situation of contemporary society, despite all scientific progress and technological conquests?

But let us return to the ‘service’ of philosophy to theology. And let us take note of another analogous ‘service’, that of mathematical science to the sciences of the phenomenon, to the extent of having to say that without mathematics there would be today neither physics, nor chemistry, nor biology, nor economics, etc. But is the service of mathematics to the other sciences an offence, or does it not rather bring out its maximum value? It makes of it a servant-master. Today it is mathematics that is the master of science and of technology; and through statistics and mathematical models, it is even becoming master of human phenomenology itself....

Something similar can be said about the service of philosophy to theology. Such service, far from leading to a diminution of philosophy, leads to its maximum valorization, not merely because it ‘serves’ theology (“*Servire Deo regnare est*,” if we still believe it), but also because it becomes a ‘servant-master’. Thus there arises the great problem: what is this ‘servant-master’ in whose hands theology finds itself today?

Let us set aside this question for a moment and analyse at greater depth the ‘service’ of philosophy to theology, which, being the service of a ‘servant-master’, does not damage the autonomy of philosophy, just as the service of mathematics to the other sciences does not damage the autonomy of mathematics. And, anyway, both mathematics and philosophy have to take care of their own ‘autonomous development’ if they are to be in a position to serve their respective sciences.

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3. The service

We could say that the service of philosophy to theology is mainly characterized by three factors:

1. it is a purely ‘*methodological*’ service;
2. it is a properly ‘*scientific*’ service;
3. it is a scientific service that is chiefly ‘*instrumental*’ (as also in the case of mathematics).

First, it is a purely ‘methodological’ service. Philosophy does not add truths to the Faith. The only ‘source’ of the truths of Faith is ‘Revelation.’ Philosophy is a ‘method’ for illuminating the revealed truths while respecting the inscrutability of the mystery. It is a service of reason to Faith.

Next, it is a properly ‘scientific’ service: it assists theological research in the elaboration and systematization of theological science, which, without such a service from a competent philosophy, is reduced to the level of a literary exercise, if not to out-of-date journalism.

Now the ‘Church’, like any civil society of the twentieth century that can neither survive nor

reality, as well as “technology” in the sense of scientific application and equipment, “depend on dynamic metaphysics” to such an extent that we can say that “economic science and reality are rooted in metaphysics”; and that the concrete human world, manipulated and threatened by technology, could have been a completely different world if at its base there had been present and operative not the dialectical metaphysics of Hegel and Marx or the positivist metaphysics of evolution, but “realist-dynamic metaphysics”.

Marx was completely correct when he located the essence of capitalism in the capitalist economy, and again when he identified collectivist economy as the central structure of socialist society. Capitalist economy is in point of fact the essence of capitalism, and collectivist economy is the central structure of socialism. These things are well known.

What we do not perhaps reflect on sufficiently is that the two types of economies are “metaphysical” and, in fact, “dynamic-metaphysical”, so that “economic science” in its fundamental formulation is a science derived from metaphysics and based on a metaphysical hypothesis, as for example modern physics in its decisive aspects is derived from mathematics and based on a logico-mathematical hypothesis. Against current opinion, it is not possible to have a “purely economic science”, one that is not conditioned by metaphysics, except in the form of simple and more or less abstract mathematical models with a rather problematic capacity for explanation and application.

Economic doctrines call for a philosophical justification and are themselves the projection of a philosophy, even to the point of being concrete expressions and incarnations of a quite precise “dynamic metaphysics” – leave alone their initial moral formulation. Adam Smith is considered the founder of capitalist economic science. He was a moral philosopher and his economic science was the expression of his moral philosophy. But capitalist economic science did not stop with Smith. The dynamic impulse of the Industrial Revolution and of the capitalist economy provoked the passage from its moral foundation to a real “dynamic metaphysical foundation”. An analogous experience is to be found in the case of collectivist economy. Its first justification, on the part of utopian and romantic socialism, was “moral”. It was Marx who conferred on it a dynamic metaphysical foundation, and thus became the first theoretician of collectivist economy in contrast to capitalist economy.

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Catholics themselves, through the famous “schools of Christian social doctrine” that flourished in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the first half of our own, attempted to configure economic science on the lines of Christian morality, trying to elaborate a “social economy” as economic science based on morality (as far as Italy is concerned, it is enough to recall Toniolo, who worked towards this end for the larger part of his life). This Catholic attempt failed; no one even remembers it anymore. What was lacking was the transposition of the moral foundation of “social economy” into a dynamic metaphysical foundation. And this was lacking because there was no “realist-dynamic metaphysics”. The historical fortunes of economic science, which we have merely alluded to, are also themselves a confirmation that economic science has its roots in dynamic metaphysics, and along with economic science, also the Industrial Revolution and the technological revolution.

The “relationship” between dynamic metaphysics (for us: realist-dynamic metaphysics) and the Industrial Revolution, including the technology and the economy that part of it, could not be clearer and more evident, even if at first sight it appears improbable and surprising. It is a fact that economic science is a science that is by inspiration and character “metaphysical”, which eventually becomes also “ideological”. This is shown by its development into “capitalist, collectivist” economy, and “realist-dynamic” (“dyn-ont-organic”) economy.

The “first truth” of economic doctrine and praxis should therefore be “metaphysical truth” and more exactly “metaphysico-dynamic” truth, on the pain of submitting to a mistaken economic theory and praxis that is definitely disastrous. But the “metaphysical truth” of economic theory and praxis does not yet exist, because “dyn-ont-organic economy” does not exist – because “realistdynamic”

metaphysics has not been present and operative. No “moral theory” could today take the place of “realist-dynamic metaphysics” in relation to the Industrial Revolution, technology and economy.

Given this, to speak of the “relationship” between “ideological revolution” (as the third permanent revolution) and “realist-dynamic metaphysics” could even be superfluous, because of the fact that no one excludes philosophy from ideology, even if on the one hand they wrongly identify ideology and philosophy, and on the other hand fail to arrive at the specific relationship between “dynamic metaphysics” and ideology as “rationalized praxis”.

It would be enough to say that dynamic metaphysics is the “definitive instrument” for codifying the rationalization of praxis, just as mathematics is the classic instrument for the rationalization of technology. Prescinding from the ideological question that will be taken up again shortly, we limit ourselves to the observation that the “correct rationalization” of praxis cannot but depend on a “correct dynamic metaphysics”, and therefore on a realist and objectively valid dynamic metaphysics. In one word, it cannot but depend on REALIST-DYNAMIC METAPHYSICS.

There is therefore not only a relationship between this metaphysics and ideology, but (and this is what matters) also between it and “correct ideology”. To relegate realist-dynamic metaphysics to the limbo of dead philosophical ideas or to the realm of spirits would be to not only misunderstand it but also to deprive ourselves of the most revolutionary instrument available to us. The three permanent revolutions we have been talking about, together with cultural revolution, form a “single revolutionary system” that for us is headed by REALIST-DYNAMIC METAPHYSICS.

This metaphysics is in itself already a “philosophical revolution”, given the radical change it implies for our traditional cultural and philosophical system. But it is above all a revolutionary metaphysics, as trigger and matrix of the whole system of permanent revolutions, along the lines of a correct and beneficial system of permanent revolutions.

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IV. THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL OUTCOME OF REALIST-DYNAMIC METAPHYSICS

1. Philosophy and theology

From what we have been saying, two things should have become evident: that realist-dynamic metaphysics refers to dynamic reality or historical reality, and that it is a key to historical reality itself, the key to its objective realist metaphysical knowledge, whether it is a question of profane historical reality become dynamic or of Christian religious historical reality that has always been dynamic. This amounts to saying that realist-dynamic metaphysics has a double outcome: an ideological one, as we have already mentioned, and an ecclesiological one.

Let us begin by examining the *ecclesiological* outcome.

The problem is delicate, and *per se* also rather technical. It is of direct interest to theologians, because ecclesiology is simply theology of the Church. We are not however addressing ourselves to theologians but rather to educated persons who are open and are believers, and who are interested in knowing, strengthening their faith, and acting. We will engage therefore in a discussion that is neither simplistic, thus failing to take into account the seriousness of the theme, nor too technical, because we do not want to get bogged down in a specialist argument for philosophers or for theologians.

With this in mind, the first thing is to give an idea of the “relationship between philosophy and theology”, considering philosophy and theology as “sciences” not in a Kantian and post-Kantian sense that reduces science to “science of the phenomenon”, but in the classic sense (Aristotle and St Thomas) of science as “science of being”.

“Being and phenomenon”: the two great themes of human scientific knowledge. The “scientific knowledge of being” is the domain of “philosophy and theology”. The “scientific knowledge of the phenomenon” is entrusted to the “sciences of the phenomenon”. One should not exclude the other. The old philosophers and theologians wrongly reduced science to the “science of being”, i.e., to philosophy and theology, excluding (or better ignoring) the science of the phenomenon, or else treating it as if it were philosophy and theology. But much worse are modern scientists and men of culture who reduce science to mathematical and phenomenal science, excluding the science of being (authentic philosophy and theology) and reducing philosophy to mathematics and to philosophy of science, or to the science of language, and even relegating theology to the world of dreams. This is something, however, that is inevitable on the part of an atheist-materialist culture, which is, in fact, largely the post-Kantian modern culture.

“Philosophy and theology as sciences of being”, therefore. And science, in the modern sense, as mathematical and dealing with the phenomenon.

Given this premise, the “relationship” between philosophy and theology becomes immediately clear, because they are both “sciences of being” which as such cannot contradict themselves and must instead support and illumine each other. Because of this a theologian cannot be a good theologian without being also a good philosopher, just as a physicist cannot be a good physicist without being also a good mathematician.

On the other hand, there is no substantial relationship between theology and mathematicalphenomenal

science, because, even when theology takes into consideration a fact or a phenomenon, it has to go to their substance; it should raise, in other words, the problem of their being, and not stop merely at the phenomenon.

For example, science observes the fact of the existence of human beings on the earth. This is a massive phenomenon that has provoked the curiosity of scientists, who have tried to explain it in terms of “evolution”. But evolution is itself a phenomenon, and, in fact, an interminable series of uncontrolled and uncontrollable phenomena. The basic problem of human beings on the earth is, instead, the problem of their “being”: “What is the human being?” It is the problem not merely of their phenomenal (evolutionary) origin, but of their “ontological” origin. Here philosophy and theology intervene, telling us that human beings are created by God (their ontological origin), that

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they are composed of soul and body, and, further, that they are elevated to the supernatural order as “children of God”.

Having said this, and having ascertained the scientific character of philosophy and theology as “sciences of being”, we have not yet finished all that needs to be said. We have to take note of the